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1 INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years of  research in the field of  intermediate targeting have clearly shown 
that finding a stable relationship between a monetary aggregate and output or in-
flation constitutes a promising but not a sufficient evidence that the particular ag-
gregate can be successfully used as an intermediate target for monetary policy. An 
obvious reason for that can be traced back to the so called Lucas-critique, stating 
that when private actors realise that a particular relationship is used for policy de-
cisions,  the  estimated parameters  become  more  or  less  irrelevant as  the  policy 
measures can be anticipated and discounted in private behaviour. Moreover, to the 
extent such a relationship is necessary for anchoring monetary policies around a 
single aggregate, its mere existence has become a rare phenomenon. In Europe for 
example, it is only Germany which still can use its M3  as a reliable intermediate 
target, and it has been suggested that it depends on the slow development of the 
German financial markets. In countries where rapid financial innovation supplied a 
wide range of close substitutes to traditional monetary assets, similar relationships 
broke down. 
In spite of the fact that a good correlation between monetary aggregates and real 
activity has been difficult to establish for individual EC-countries, several studies 
indicate  that  such  a relationship  exists  at the  Community  level.  It is  therefore 
tempting to draw the conclusion that centralising monetary policies and targeting 
Community-wide aggregates can be a promising alternative to the existing system. 
Nevertheless, without questioning the empirical findings,  several question marks 
can be put at the conclusion that all essential preconditions for monetary targeting 
at the Community level exist. The interpretation problem is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Chapter 2 is therefore devoted to a general investigation of the problem, starting 
with basic concepts, then trying to find a rationale for monetary targeting at the 
European level and finally investigating some of the consequences such a change 
may have on the functioning of the ERM. At one level, the conclusions are quite 
trivial as  several well-known difficulties for successful targeting are found to be 
relevant and that a change of  the present regime would drastically change the cli-
mate for policy coordination in the Community. 
Chapter 3 summarises some econometric studies, which find a stable relationship 
between a European monetary aggregate, inflation and output. Having established 
this fact, we contrast some of  the conditions for the ex ante stability of  the function 
with the actual economic environment when it will be used, focusing especially on 
the influence of  the present system on the estimators, and the influence of  various 
types of  financial innovation when the time for actual targeting comes. Again, the 
basic conclusion is that the econometric evidence is far from convincing about the 
prospects of actual targeting, giving the false  impression of finding a solution to 
current problems. 
· Finally, chapter 4 takes up the difficulties of  achieving unanimous decisions about 
the monetary target, given differences in the preferences of  the member states. We 
also examine some of the difficulties in controlling money supply in a decentral--2-
ised institutional arrangement,  i.e.  an environment where national central banks 
still play a role in monetary management and the European aggregate is considered 
as the sum of national money. No substantial room is found for democracy,  or 
subsidiarity, unless one is willing to bear economic costs in terms of unwarranted 
inflation, inefficiency and dynamics which are not compatible with other, more 
fundamental, ambitions of  the Community. 
In conclusion, several reasons for a cautious interpretation of  the econometric evi-
dence are presented. However, it must be strongly emphasised that just as the com-
forting empirical results are found insufficient as a guarantee for successful actual 
targeting, so is the scepticism arising from our critical remarks not sufficient for 
ruling out this possibility. Nothing but preconditions are examined in both cases, 
and both suffer from their ex ante nature. 
2  TARGETING MONEY SUPPLY: PROBLEMS AND POSSmiLITIES 
As Europe moves towards the creation of a monetary union, the question of inter-
mediate targeting for the prospective European Central Bank (ECB) came to the 
surface. It  is particularly important for the Community to find reliable intermediate 
variables, not only because one needs to show that a good technical alternative to 
the present system there exists, but also because such variables may facilitate two 
other functions, namely monitoring the actions of the ECB and exercising central 
bank accountability. The latter are probably of more fundamental importance, be-
cause member states face the prospect of  voluntarily abdicating national monetary 
policies in favour of  an independent, supra-national institution. 
Targeting a European Monetary Aggregate (EMA) would therefore serve a double 
purpose. The first is the traditional one of providing a means of anchoring mone-
tary policies.  The  second consists of making the  operating actions of the ECB 
more transparent, not only for market participants but also for the governments of 
the member states.  However, virtually all economists share the opinion that it is 
difficult to maintain a good correlation between intermediate and ultimate vari-
ables, if  the former are systematically used in order to affect the latter. Then, the 
dilemma of  using an intermediate variable only as an economic indicator, i.e. "soft 
use",  or as an indicator of the policy stance,  i.e.  "hard use",  arises.  Soft use is 
probably necessary for the functionality of the intermediate variable in the long-
run,  but hard use is what monetary authorities from-time-to-time  are tempted to 
adopt in order to correct disequilibria.  So, if  the trade-off is relevant, there is a 
time consistency problem, insofar an intermediate variable becomes useless when 
used. The following review of  basic concepts and relations may help to clarify the 
reasons. 
2.1 Basic Concepts 
Box 1 gives an illustrative description of the concepts usually encountered in the 
debate of intermediate targeting.  The most well-defined concepts are the instru--3-
ments and the ultimate targets, found at the two extreme points of the spectrum. 
Between them, there is a range of  variables classified either as operating or inter-
mediate targets whose function is to link the two extremes. These two concepts 
are overlapping and which measure falls under one or the other category depends 
on how well monetary authorities can control it. Operating targets are better linked 
to the instruments with respect to the controllability property, whereas intermedi-
ate targets are usually better correlated with the ultimate targets. 
Following this structure, it is easiest to understand the use of intermediate vari-
ables if  monetary policy is decomposed into two or three stages.1 In the first stage, 
central banks determine the value of the intermediate target which would be con-
sistent with the desired ultimate policy objective, under a variety of ex ante  as-
sumptions. At the second stage, the central bank proceeds, in some ex post fashion, 
to treat achieving this value of  the intermediate target as if  doing so were the ob-
jective governing policy. This second stage can be further decomposed in the same 
backward fashion into two substages. First, the central bank sets operating targets 
which are consistent with the intermediate targets  and which,  also ex post,  are 
treated as if  they were the ultimate policy objective. Second, daily use of the in-
struments is governed by the objective of achieving the operating targets, as if  the 
latter were the overriding policy objective. 
This backward  procedure hints at the existence of (at least) two problems.  The 
first consists of  the controllability of the intermediate targets.  Clearly, all inter-
mediate variables are endogenous and controlling money supply presupposes that 
Central Banks exert satisfactory control over the money-creation process. The sec-
ond stems from the difficulties of maintaining good correlation between interme-
diate and ultimate targets, the s.c. stability problem. To the extent rational expec-
tations guide the actions of  private actors, there is a risk that market manipulations 
undertaken by monetary authorities in order to achieve price or quantity changes 
are anticipated, and, on average, monetary policies have no effect. Besides, finan-
cial innovation provides continuously an appropriate panoply of hedging instru-
ments, sufficient to make monetary policy quite ineffective. So,  the links in the 
1 See also Friedman (1990). -4-
chain of variables connecting instruments with ultimate targets is probably fragile 
and time variable. Central banks can either lose control over the intermediate vari-
ables or, the latter can show a poor correlation with the goals of monetary policy. 
These risks have been at heart of  the debate. 
The controllability problem arises from the fact that each and every of these vari-
ables is endogenous in reality, even if  in macroeconomic modelling they are  so-
metimes treated as pre-determined (set by the monetary authorities). Thus, a first 
trade  off appears  between controllability and fitness.  Intermediate  variables  are 
usually chosen because of  their good correlation with the ultimate variables but are 
more difficult to control than operating targets. 
The  second trade-off has  relates  stability and usefulness.  Intermediate variables 
that are well correlated and under reasonable control usually lose these properties 
when they are exploited as "targets", i.e. they are subjected to regular manipulation 
in order to achieve the ultimate targets. This is because actors can predict the di-
rections  of such  changes,  if they  know  the  nonnative  importance  monetary 
authorities attach to  each observation.  Therefore,  a risk for  slippages and over-
shooting emerges as actors anticipate the stance of next-period policies. If  for ex-
ample money supply is used as an intermediate target, and it currently exerts infla-
tionary pressure beyond the  target,  an  anticipated  monetary  tightening  can be 
neutralised as an effect of portfolio rearrangements, whereby monetary assets are 
substituted for non-monetary ones with high liquidity. Asset substitution reduces 
monetary holdings without affecting the propensity to spending, and fears of ex-
cessive tightening may imply dramatic shifts in money demand without any sig-
nificant effect on sectors deploying active portfolio management.  Monetary poli-
cies of  this kind become quite ineffective as the time passes and it can only affect 
income distribution. 
A third trade-off sets the limits between short-run use and long-run optimisation 
for monetary authorities.  It has been argued that monetary policies cannot affect 
output and employment in the long-run. This view has gained some empirical sup-
port as it has been found that the most successful central banks have conducted 
monetary policies only with a view on nominal variables. Optimal use of  monetary 
policies over the long-run would therefore require that the set of  ultimate targets is 
confined to price stability. 
If  so, intermediate targets can be best used to verify that the longer-run thrust of 
policy is  consistent with long-run price  stability,  given that a good  correlation 
between  inflation  and  the  intermediate  variable  exists.  If this  is  possible,  an-
nouncement of the intermediate target and adherence to it can serve as a "policy 
rule", in the sense the term is used in the time-consistency literature. 
2.3 Optimal Choices 
One of the conclusions from the previous section is that it is not possible to find 
the  optimal  intermediate  target before  the  ultimate  target  is  set.  So,  there  is  a 
choice  to  be  made  at  each  level  and,  of course,  we  need  some  criteria  for -5-
optimality. The two subsequent sections are therefore devoted to the questions of 
what might be the most appropriate ultimate and intermediate variables. 
2.3.1 The Ultimate Target 
In principle, there are three possibilities: Output, inflation or both. On one extreme 
there is the neoclassical school asserting that in the long-run output is determined 
by real factors (the potential output). Hence, in the long-run, monetary policies 
affect only prices and its corollary is that no sustainable real effects can be bought 
by means of higher inflation. This view has been further refined within the new-
classical tradition, underpined with the rational expectations way of  modelling. Its 
message  is  that  monetary  policies  may  have  real  effects  only  if monetary 
authorities  succeed in surprising  economic  actors,  which by definition  can be 
achieved only on exceptional occasions. 
This kind of short-run output oriented monetary policies may have some transi-
tional effects but they are also associated with at least two negative effects, shown 
in the long-run. First, it creates informational noise and increases the uncertainty 
about the environment in which economic decisions are taken.  Second,  private 
actors are not completely ignorant about the probability of a surprise,  since the 
preferences of the central banks in a democratic society are more or less known. 
Given that a certain probability of "surprise" is built-in in the economy, short-run 
policies  are  successful  only if they  surpass  expectations,  raising  this  way the 
threshold for securing some real effects. The costs in terms of inflation are there-
fore accelerating and the returns in terms of  increased output (employment) dimin-
ishing.  In other words, there is a critical point at which it does not pay to continue 
surprising private actors, and the problem is that this high-inflation natural-unem-
ployment point is reached automatically if  the private sector anticipates the proc-
ess. This is the message from the time-consistency or credibility literature2• High 
inflation is not necessarily a product of  current inflationary policies. It is sufficient 
that prices and wages hedge market actors against such a risk. 
The policy conclusions obtained from this literature are straightforward. Binding 
rules  are preferred to  discretionary power,  because the  latter may give rise  to 
expectations about short-run,  output oriented policies.  Moreover,  central banks 
must  be  independent  that  is  not  inclined  to  yield  to  political  pressures  for 
employment boosting policies, and with an unquestionable price stabili1y policy 
target. 
Recent surveys by Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabelini  (1991)  and Eichengreen (1992) 
support  these  conclusions.  It  is  found  that  central  banks  acting  according  to 
institutional rules  which guarantee  independence,  measures  according  to  some 
indices,  and  long-run  antiinflationary  policy  orientation  have  been  the  most 
successful, in the sense that they have a better record with respect to inflation than 
central banks which persued monetary policies with a view on a mixture of real 
2 See Persson-Tabelini (1988) for a review. -6-
and nominal variables, whereas there is no empirical support that the latter cate-
gory has been more successful in sustaining a lower rate unemployment. 
These findings are in line with the statutes of the ECB in the Maastricht Treaty. 
Interpreting the statutes of the  ECB,  Alesina-Grilli ( 1991)  draw the conclusion 
that, in terms of institutional prerequisites, the ECB can be positioned alongside 
the German Bundesbank. The following discussion takes therefore price stability 
as the given ultimate target. Having established this, the most obvious candidates 
for intermediate targeting, i.e. exchange rates, interest rates and money supply can 
be examined. 
2.3.2 The Intermediate Target 
Fixing the exchange rate is very important for an economy with a big external 
sector. Looking at the Community of today, it is easy to notice that it consists of 
countries  which  are  small  and  medium-sized  open  economies  with  the  intra-
community trade being the dominating part of  their external sectors. It is therefore 
natural to prefer exchange rate stability. This will not, however, be the case when 
the EMU becomes a reality, because Europe will be a large closed economy and 
the uncertainty stemming from devaluation risks for the intra-community trade will 
be automatically removed.  Exchange rate stability vis-a-vis third currencies will 
therefore become less compelling for the European economy than it currently is 
for its member states. 
Looking at the relative merits of the interest rates and monetary aggregates one 
must find criteria to make the comparison. In a world without risks and complete 
absence of shocks, the task becomes trivial because interest rates and money sup-
ply are  perfectly controlled and there  is  an one-to-one  relation between them. 
Thus, following Poole's classic contribution in the field, an intermediate target is 
optimal if  it provides for good absor.ption of external shocks.  3 It is easy to justify 
in the context of a traditional IS-LM model for a closed economy that monetary 
targeting is the best policy rule if  real shocks are predominant and interest rate tar-
geting is the most appropriate rule in case monetary chocks dominate. The reason 
is  that  real  shocks  tend  to  induce  interest  rate  movements  in  a  way  that 
systematically dampen the original shocks, if  money supply remains unchanged. If 
interest rates are flexible, which is the case when money supply is targeted, these 
movements will be realised, absorbing part of  the shocks. If  they are not, which is 
the case when interest rates are targeted,  money supply must accommodate the 
swings in money demand. Income variability is therefore maximised. 4 
This is shown in diagram 1, with IS" representing a boom and IS' a sudden drop in 
real demand. Interest rate flexibility implies that the new equilibria are established 
in positions A and B.  Targeting the interest rate however, implies that increased 
money demand during the boom must be accompanied by increased money supply 
(LM") or, in the other case by monetary tightening (LM').  Monetary policies are 
3 See Poole (1970) 
4 An excellent review of  the optimal target litterature is Friedman (1990). -7-
therefore  procyclical,  and  the  equilibrium hovers  between  the  points  C and  D. 
Money supply targeting is therefore optimal in the sense it minimises income vari-
ability. 
The opposite will happen if  the same policy rule is applied when the shocks appear 
on the monetary side. Assume for example the case of a sudden rise in velocity, 
with the attending drop in money demand. If  money supply remains unchanged, 
excess liquidity will press the interest rate down to point F in diagram 2, or, it will 
push it up to G if  the opposite had happened. Monetary targeting should therefore 
make income to oscillate between Y" and Y'. If  money supply is flexible,  excess 
liquidity would be mopped up, or, excess demand for liquidity provided in order to 
keep the interest rate constant. In any case the shocks would not be transmitted to 
the real side because the interest rate is not allowed to move.  Hence, the optimal 
policy rule is  interest rate targeting. 
Going  back  a step  to  the  credibility  aspect,  Poole's  analysis  would  allow  the 
formulation of  a policy rule which stabilises potential output. If  so, there is a good 
chance  to  avoid  high  variability in  inflation.  Targeting  interest rates  at a level 
consistent with potential output estimates is a good rule if  monetary disturbances 
are  the  problem.  Similarly,  a rule  for  monetary  growth  consistent with  money 
demand around potential output constitutes an optimal long-run rule, if  the most 
frequent disturbances have their origin in the real side of  the economy. 
Needles to say that interest rate targeting is equivalent to exchange rate targeting, 
if  the exchange rate  commi1ment is credible and capital movements unrestricted. 
The reason is that perfect capital mobility implies that the uncovered interest rate 
parity  condition,  rA  = r8 + e,  where  r;  is  country  i'  s  interest  rate  and  e the 
expected  depreciation  of the  currency  of country  A vis-a-vis  the  currency  of 
country  B.  A credible  exchange  rate  means  that  e=O  and  rA =  r8.  Thus,  if a 
country keeps the exchange rate fixed when different asymmetric shocks affi.ict the 
own  economy,  exchange  rate  targeting  and  interest  rate  targeting  become 
equivalent.  Moreover,  in  case  the  exchange  rate  is  targeted,  money  supply  is 
automatically  adjusted  to  money  demand  because  capital  flows  eliminate  any 
tendencies  for  interest rate  differentials.  For  example,  excess  liquidity tends  to 
create a negative interest rate differential, inducing outflow of  capital. By the same 
token,  excess  demand  for  money  will be  instantly  accommodated  by  capital 
inflows.  If these  flows  are  not  sterilised,  monetary  equilibrium  is  always 
guaranteed. Thus, exchange rate targeting is to be recommended in case monetary 
disturbances dominate.' 
s The argument holds even if  the exchange rate is not credible but the devaluation risk is time-
invariable. In this case e  is a constant and capital flows are triggered when the interest rate differential 
differs from e. -8--9-
2.3.3 Which variable? 
The basic conclusion from the analysis above is that the whole issue of  chosing the 
most appropriate intermediate variable boils down to the empirical question about 
the most likely sources of  disturbance in the foreseeable future. In other words, the 
crucial point contains elements about which one only can speculate. 
Undoubtedly, financial innovation, further discussed in section 3.3, will remain a 
factor of  monetary instability. However, financial markets have been liberalised in 
the course of the  1980s, and the wave of shocks the European economies experi-
enced in the wake of financial deregulation is about to abate.  Thus, what can be 
expected to the turn of  the century is a continuing strain owing to further exploita-
tion of the possibilities that can be attributed to market globalisation,  technologi-
cal innovation and the attending decline in transaction costs. 
On the real side, the process of  exploiting profitable possibilities is more sluggish, 
due to considerable sunk-costs.  So, the full effects of the internal market and the 
new political environment in Europe have not yet seen the light. The expected re-
structuring of  the European industries in order to take advantage of the economies 
of scale and comparative advantages, the cathing-up of  the poor member countries 
and the quite unpredictable consequences of  the yet unknown future trade relations 
between the Community and the  former  communist countries in the  central and 
eastern Europe, certainly constitute sources of  mighty real shocks. 
Against this  background,  a plausible  scenario for the  optimistic  advocate  of the 
internal market and sound trade relations with neighbouring countries, is that the 
real shocks will be quite considerable and, probably, predominant, at least during 
the next decade or so. Having adopted this view, the logical consequence is that a 
Community-wide monetary aggregate might be the optimal choice as an interme-
diate variable, at least as long as real life supports the underlying assumption about 
the relative  strength and frequency of the  shocks.  There is  at least no reason to 
reject the assumption that monetary targeting is a good choice on the basis of the 
shock aspect.  · 
2.3 Targets versus Indicators 
Intermediate variables have proven to be very sensitive to their use.  Trying to ex-
ploit their correlation with ultimate targets, as if there is a strong casual relation-
ship between them,  is sometimes considered as the main reason behind the break-
down of  the correlation. 
In principle, there are two potential uses for an ex ante good correlation between 
money supply and output or inflation. One consists of using it as an indicator of 
the current state of the economy. There is a strong case for looking at money sup-
ply as a timely indicator because financial statistics is easier to collect than meas-
ures of  real output in most countries. It is also found that the path of  narrow money 
often leads the time path of  real output and inflation. The other potential use of  an 
intermediate variable is to treat it as an indicator of the policy stance. This is the -10-
case when one tends to believe in causality.  The question is whether there is a 
trade-off between these alternative uses. 
Good correlation between two endogenous variables is by definition not equivalent 
to a  strong casual relationship between the same variables.  In general, it is ex-
pected that variables which show a very close short-run correlation with real ac-
tivity, such as total wealth, are usually beyond the accurate control of  the authori-
ties. On the other hand, variables under good control, as narrow money, only have 
a remote conceptual connection with ultimate variables and, of course, empirical 
correlation must be influenced by the behaviour of  many other variables. 
It shows that the issue is not only of theoretical interest. It has consequences for 
our view of  the potential uses of  the intermediate variables. Considering alternative 
transmission mechanisms for monetary policy, good correlation between money 
and, say, nominal income, can be found in either of  the following cases. 
Case 1:  Instruments --~) Money  )  Nominal Income 
Case 2:  Instruments --~) Nominal Income  )  Money 
In the first case, monetary instruments affect nominal income because they affect 
money. This is the monetaristic view and if  it is adopted, controllability of  money, 
the intermediate target, is of  utmost importance. 
Assume  however that the  challenging  view is  correct,  namely that credit,  not 
money, is what really matters.  There is of course a  clo'se  statistical correlation 
between the two measures, as one is found on the liability side and the other on the 
asset side of the banking sector.  So, if  real activity is propelled by credit expan-
sion, there would be a good correlation between money and real activity as well, at 
least as long as deposit banks stand for the bulk of the credit supply. If  monetary 
policies, say high interest rates, reduce credit demand and nominal income, then 
money demand will decline as well. In this case controllability of  money is of sec-
ondary importance (but not controllability of credit). The same is true if  interest 
rates affect nominal income directly, due to their impact on wealth, which in turn 
is reflected in monetary holdings. Again, controllability of  long-term interest rates 
becomes crucial and the only use of  money in these cases is of a timely indicator. 
This potential use presupposes that there are information lags on the current devel-
opment of  the economic activity, and that the relationship between money and in-
come is stable. 
Whatever is true with respect to transmission of monetary policies, a stable rela-
tionship between money and ultimate targets seems to be necessary in both cases. 
As a matter of  fact, stability is a weaker property than controllability, in the sense 
that controllability becomes more or less useless in case of instability. The oppo-
site, however, is not necessarily true.  Money supply can be out of the range of 
monetary authorities without losing its importance as a good economic indicator. 
The general notion among economists is that stability is undermined by the active 
use of  intermediate variables as targets rather than indicators. The reason is that fi-
nancial innovation supplies instruments that help private actors to better hedge 
their  portfolios  and  prevent  monetary  policies  from  affecting  their  business. 
Quantitative controls can also be by-passed by the same token. For example, secu-- ll-
ritization reduces the possibilities of the monetary authorities to affect credit ex-
pansion, since control over the latter presupposes that the bulk of private sector 
credit is supplied by deposit banks, which are subjected under the supervision of 
the monetary authorities. Moreover, increased credit expansion outside the bank-
ing sector would damage the relationship between money and final goals,  espe-
cially if one adopts the view that credit, wherever it is generated, has an impact 
upon them.6 
In conclusion,  stability in the link between intermediate variables and final goals 
is  a  necessary  property,  independently  of the  particular  use  of the  variable. 
Controllability is important only if  the intermediate variable is used as a target, but 
less material if  used as an indicator. Nevertheless, systematic use of  a variable as a 
target entails the risk that both properties disappear. 
2.4 Why Targeting a European Monetary Aggregate 
Despite the warnings raised in the previous section, several useful functions can be 
attached to intermediate targeting, especially in the case faced by the Community. 
Taking for given that a stable long-run relation to ultimate targets exists, relatively 
prompt reporting and leading indicator properties make money a timely indicator 
of economic activity.  It can therefore form a basis for formulation of monetary 
policies. Next, used as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy, a monetary 
target constitutes a useful means of communicating the intention of the European 
Central Bank to the European governments, to fmancial markets and, more gen-
erally, to the public. This might be a particularly sensitive issue in the case of  the 
EMU,  because  announcing its  intentions in a  persuasive  way,  the  independent 
ECB can help the governments in formulating their fiscal policies, so that the at-
tained policy mix is appropriate. 
Moreover, following the backward procedure mentioned in section 2.1, intermedi-
ate targets form a basis for central bank accountability. If  the monetary targets are 
derived in a consistent way from the commonly formulated and generally accepted 
price stability target, the procedure of monitoring the actions of the ECB will be 
helped by the use of  feasible intermediate targets.  Accountability can be exercised 
on the basis of  the intermediate targets, and it will be also easy to go a step further 
and examine whether the operating targets have been appropriate with respect to 
the intermediate target. 
The advantage of  using an intermediate rather than an ultimate variable for the ac-
countability procedure stems from the fact that accountability must be based on 
variables which are under reasonable control. This constraint makes ultimate tar-
gets less attractive. Moreover, monitoring the operations of the ECB requires an 
informational link between inflation, other policy objectives, e.g. employment, and 
the operating targets. If  the ECB does not provide this link explicitly, despite its 
relative competence to do it,  all the other parts who are interested in monetary 
6 The causality debate goes back to Gurley-Shaw (19SS).  Gertler (1988) gives an insightful overview. 
See also Bernanke (1983),  Stiglitz (1989) and Blinder-Stiglitz (1983). - 12-
policies (the governments, the markets, the Commission etc) will do it independ-
ently from each other. It is not difficult to imagine a situation when all operations 
are scrutinised with conflicting views, especially when even conflicting interests 
are present. 
Intermediate targets facilitate also the formulation of policy rules,  meaning that 
explicit monetary targets help to narrow down the room for discretionary jumps in 
the  policy.  This  is  an  additional  advantage,  which  may  create  discipline  and 
strengthen the credibility of  the ECB, according to the insights of  the time-consis-
tency literature.  Formulation of intermediate targets de facto  reduces the  set of 
discretionary measures to what is consistent with price stability. As Davis (1990) 
puts it, "the appeal of  intermediate targets in providing a nominal anchor for policy 
decisions is fairly clear. Such targets can provide, in principle, an indication that 
the longer run thrust of policy will be consistent with longer run goals for price 
behaviour". 
Another argument for moving towards policies based on targeting an ERM-wide 
monetary aggregate,  appeared in connection with the crisis in the exchange rate 
mechanism,  the ERM.  The  idea is  that targeting  an ERM-wide  aggregate  will 
automatically bring symmetry to the system. Clearly, in a Community of equals it 
is difficult to fmd arguments for conducting monetary policies based on leader-
follower relations among the countries, as we do in the asymmetric system of to-
day.  It is one of the reasons for taking as given the idea of targeting an EMA in 
stage m  of  the EMU. Nevertheless, the recent ERM crisis, where the leadership of 
Germany has been questioned, helped to revive the interest of targeting a com-
munity-wide monetary aggregate even before stage m, in the hope that it would 
strengthen the stability of  the ERM and/or restore the credibility of  the parity grid. 
It is therefore of  particular interest to examine the consequences of  such a change, 
which is made in the next section. 
In conclusion, the risks a central bank runs when intermediate variables are used as 
targets rather than as simple indicators must be weighted against the numerous ad-
vantages of doing the latter.  Since long-run stability is necessary, targets should 
also be used as long-run indicators of  the policy stance. Early announcement of a 
monetary target can serve as a policy rule which, if  credible, may help to maintain 
monetary stability at low social costs. 
2.5  Consequences for the ERM 
Financialliberalisation and integration in Europe have proceeded to a degree that 
lends substantial realism to the traditional assumption of perfect capital mobility. 
There is therefore good reason to believe that the uncovered interest rate parity 
condition, rA =  rB + i, where i  is the expected rate of depreciation of  the currency 
of country A, holds. Obviously, the interest parity condition holds for any level of 
interest rates, and this indeterminacy gives rise to the problem of  anchoring the ex-
change rate mechanism around a particular interest rate level. 
In principle, the available possibilities are two, termed symmetric and asymmetric. 
In its pure form, the asymmetric system is one in which a single country, usually (3) 
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called the centre country7,  is chosen to conduct an independent monetary policy 
whereas the rest of  the countries participating in the exchange rate mechanism, the 
so called peripheral countries, conduct policies that only maintain the exchange 
rates fixed. Arranging division of  responsibilities this way implies that the system 
is anchored around a  common interest rate which is produced by the monetary 
policy of the centre colUltry.  The mechanism equalising interest rates across the 
countries is capital movements. In the sequel, capital movements are assumed to 
be perfect. 
In the other extreme model, the symmetric one, monetary policies are co-ordinated 
so as an area-wide monetary aggregate is targeted. This model is compatible with a 
variety of institutional solutions, ranging from completely centralised (a common 
central bank) to completely decentralised forms in which national central banks 
target a fraction of the total aggregate by controlling domestic credit expansion. 
Worth noticing is that even this model produces a common interest rate for the 
whole area, if  financial markets are completely integrated. 
There is little doubt that the ERM, as it functions for the time being, is very close 
to  the theoretical  !,symmetric  system of fixed  exchange  rates,  with Germany 
playing the role of  the anchor or centre colUltry.  Several studies verify this state-
ment, reviewed in Gross-Thygesen (1992) and Fratianni-von Hagen(1992).8  The 
historical reason for this choice was a solid belief that the monetary policies of  the 
Bundesbank could guarantee the lowest possible interest rate, the floor for the na-
tional interest rates.  However, the ERM has never been a perfectly asymmetric 
system, as there is evidence that German monetary policy has been conducted un-
der some -even if  limited- consideration of  the economic situation in other member 
states and the stability of the whole system. However, for the purpose of the fol-
lowing analysis the term asymmetric model refers to the theoretical model rather 
than to the existing system.  9 
2.5.1 Fluctuations and Distribution of Liquidity 
As already mentioned, capital flows are the basic mechanism for monetary equi-
librium.  Moreover, if  the parity grid is credible, interest rates become identical 
throughout the CommlUlity and any disturbances inducing local movements in in-
terest rates will immediately also set capital flows in motion. The direction of  such 
flows is of  crucial importance lUlder the !,Symmetric regime, because it determines 
7 The terms centre and periphery have been adopted only for the purpose of distinguishing countries 
which conduct independent monetary policy from those which do not. No normative meaning is attached 
to the terms. 
8 Worth noticing is also that there are official statements verifying the opinion of an asymmetric ERM. 
For example, commenting reamt events in the ERM, the Governor of  the Belgian Central Bank stated 
that "Whatever happens, the central bank will stick to its policy of  sticking close to the mark as the 
anchor currency it always was and will remain"; REUTER 17 March 1993. 
9 A detailed and more rigorous presentation of  the properties of  the two systems can be found in the 
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total liquidity in the Community. Important is also that the whole adjustment takes 
place in the periphery for a very simple reason. 
Under the asymmetric system, the centre country targets its money supply and, by 
definition, will not allow capital flows to derail its monetary policy. Capital flows 
are therefore an expression of disequilibrium which must be corrected by adjust-
ment in the peripheral countries. As a consequence, an outflow from the periphery 
to the centre by definition reflects a situation in which interest rates in the periph-
ery are too low, and they will be raised automatically if the outflow also reduces 
money holdings there. A capital flow will therefore reduce money supply in the 
periphery but not in the centre. Naturally, even the area-wide money supply will 
decline by the same amount as in the periphery. 
If  the opposite is noticed, i.e. a capital flow from the centre to the periphery, the 
outflow will be sterilised in the centre country but not in the periphery.  Money 
supply in the periphery, and the whole region, will increase by the same amount. 
Again, the whole adjustment takes place in the periphery as the construction of  the 
system gives the privilege of monetary autonomy only to the centre country. Ar-
guments about how to  share the burden of adjustment when disequilibrium in 
capital markets appears is ruled out by the inherent logic of  the system. 
The asymmetric system is therefore one which provides good conditions in terms 
of the interest rate level, given that the anchor currency lives up to the expected 
quality, at the expense of  leaving all responsibility for adjustment in the periphery. 
Capital flows are always viewed as signals for monetary adjustment in the periph-
ery. 
Under the symmetric system, the treatment of intra-regional  capital flows  be-
comes symmetric as well. Assuming identical money multipliers,  a  capital flow 
from one country to another leaves the area-wide aggregate unchanged only if  the 
out- and in-flows are not sterilised anywhere.  The common monetary target is 
therefore best defended if all countries share the adjustment burden, in the sense 
that capital flows are allowed to bring about new equilibria, in which all interest 
rates have moved as a consequence of  liquidity redistribution. 
In conclusion, the basic difference between the two systems is located in the en-
dogenity or exogenity of total money supply and which parts of the system are 
supposed to bear the costs associated with the variability in money supply. 
2.5.2 Shocks and alternative adjustments 
Combining the above mentioned features  of the symmetric/asymmetric  systems 
with Poole's analysis of the effects of various types of shocks can help us to in-
vestigate further the consequences of  a transition from one system to the other.  As 
the asymmetric system is constructed, it can be perceived as providing good pro-
tection against real  shocks in the centre but as destabilising for the  peripheral 
economies if real  shocks  occur there.  On the other hand,  it shelters the  latter 
against monetary shocks, leaving the former completely unprotected against them. 
Accordingly, targeting an area-wide aggregate, with the consequence of bringing -15-
symmetry to the system, is bound to bring symmetry even to pattern of  the effects 
similar disturbances will have on the participating economies. 
As explained in detail in the appendix, a real shock is expected to affect real activ-
ity and interest rates if  it occurs in the centre country. This is because monetary 
targeting allows the interest rate to be used as an absorbing mechanism in the cen-
tre. By the same token, a similar shock in the periphery affects real activity and the 
money supply. The latter is adjusted automatically due to capital flows. As the real 
shock brings disequilibrium in monetary markets, tendencies for interest rates to 
rise or fall induce capitals flows which,  as  they are not sterilised, affect money 
supply. What is more interesting is that money sup,ply always accommodates the 
real shock. The initial shock is therefore magnified as booms tend to raise interest 
rates and recessions to lower them. 
Another interesting feature is that shocks in the centre transmit an adverse shock in 
the periphery but real shocks in the periphery do not reach the centre. The reason 
is that the common interest rate is set exclusively by the former.  As interest rates 
move in a way that dampens real activity fluctuations,  the common interest rate 
will rise in case of  a boom and will fall in case of  a recession in the centre.  Thus, 
if business  cycles  are  not  synchronized,  the  asymmetric  regime  constitutes  a 
destabilising factor for the peripheral economies. 
For similar reasons, monetary shocks are also transmitted only in one direction, 
from the centre to the periphery because only the former posses the ability of set-
ting interest rates. This is however of more theoretical interest because an asym-
metric system is chosen just for the sake of  the solid stability in the centre country. 
As it is also expected from Poole's model, monetary shocks in the periphery are 
completely absorbed, as all tendencies for interest rate movements are neutralised 
by capital flows which are sterilised in the centre country. 
Bringing more symmetry in the exchange rate system automatically implies that 
the one-way transmission of the shocks becomes two-way. Real as well as mone-
tary shocks will affect the common interest rate regardless the geographical origin. 
Nevertheless, assuming that the probability of monetary shocks to occur is larger 
in the present periphery than in the centre, such a reform is liable to be accompa-
nied by increased monetary instability. Moreover, the incentives for actively using 
fiscal  policies  in  order  to  stabilise  the  peripheral  economies  weaken,  as  the 
mechanism reinforcing fluctuations in real income also weakens.  The symmetric 
system is therefore preferable to the asymmetric one on distributional grounds but 
it may imply a more relaxed attitude  towards  real  convergence.  It is  not clear 
which system provides more  structural stability in the long-run  as  one form  of 
tensions is exchanged by another. 
This feature becomes more conspicuous if  the assumption of  full credibility in the 
exchange rate commitments is removed. Under the asymmetric regime, a specula-
tive attack on a currency belonging to a peripheral country takes the form of a 
massive capital flow.  Assuming that the entire flow is directed towards the centre 
country, the inflow there will be continuously sterilised until the required interest 
rate differential is achieved by the monetary squeeze of the periphery. Again, the 
entire adjustment cost is born by the peripheral country and awareness of these -16-
consequences is the basic disciplinary device in such a system. Symmetry means 
non-sterilisation of inflows into the  (former)  centre  economy which pushes the 
whole interest rate structure downwards.  The interest rate differential required by 
markets can be  achieved at a lower level and the lower adjustment cost for the 
country with the weak currency may prove detrimental for the sustainability of  the 
exchange rate mechanism in the long-run. 10 
2.6 The Aggregation Problem 
The task of  producing a reliable monetary aggregate for the entire Community has 
been allotted to a group of specialists working under the Committee of Central 
Bank Governors.  The group has so far produced a report on the inconsistencies 
between existing national broad aggregates,  and has therefore put forward pro-
posals and suggestions aiming at improving the reliability of national aggregates 
and facilitating the aggregation procedure. 
On one level, the problem seems to be two-dimentional: First, one has to define 
which types of  assets will be included in the national aggregates, focusing on the 
liquidity aspect of the assets.  This is not a trivial task,  as differences in market 
10 See section A3 in the appendix. -17-
conditions and institutional arrangements must be taken into account. Second, one 
has to find a way of  dividing the existing total monetary assets in Europe so as the 
national statistics add up to a reliable Community aggregate. This could be tenned 
as a statistical inference problem, since insufficient data must be used in a way 
that closely reflect the existing actual aggregate. 
2.6.1 Harmonisation of  National Aggregates 
The  complexity of adding up  national data in order to capture  a proxy for the 
european aggregate is illustrated in diagram 3. Using the three criteria deployed in 
the work of  the group under the Governors' Committee, eight (8) different types of 
monetary assets can be generated. These criteria are: 
Cl: Residence of the Holder; an actor can be either resident (R) or non-
resident (NR) in a country. 
C2: Location of  the Issuer; The financial intermediary issuing the asset can 
be located either at the home country (H) or abroad (A). Finally, 
C3:  Currency of denomination of the asset; a monetary asset is denomi-
nated either in the domestic currency (D) or in a foreign currency, (F). 
A monetary asset can therefore be described by its three elements, (R/NR), (HI  A) 
and (D/F). For example, the monetary asset of a non-bank resident in a country 
which  holds  an  account  with  a  bank  abroad  in  the  currency  of his  residence 
country is  [(R) (A) (D)].  By the same token,  the asset [(R) (H) (F)]  defines the 
holdings of a resident's monetary assets held at an account with a domestic bank 
and denominated in a foreign currency. 
The  point  of presenting  monetary  assets  this  way  is  to  demonstrate  that  the 
problem  of harmonizing  national  monetary  statistics  does  not  stop  with  the 
definition of  the liquidity characteristics of  the assets. The international dimension 
of the  assets  puts  additional  consistency  constraints  which  must  be  carefully 
respected before the numbers become compatible for addition. Otherwise the sum 
will not reflect exactly what one perceives as a European monetary aggregate, i.e. 
the monetary holdings of  the European private sector. 
For example, the British aggregate omits monetary assets held by U.K. residents in 
British banks if  they are denominated in, say Deutsche Marks. Similarly, it omits 
all  monetary  assets  held  by U.K.  residents  in foreign  banks,  even  if they  are 
located  within  the  EC.  If the  same  practice  is  followed  by  other  countries, 
aggregation  to  the  Community  level  is  bound  to  suffer  from  considerable 
omissions of much of  the private sector's monetary holdings. As existing practices 
in Greece,  Spain,  U.K.  and Luxembourg  make  use  of all  three  criteria in their 
national M3-definitions, the only assets captured by their respective M3s  are  of 
type [(R) (H) (D)], and so will their four-country aggregate. 
A combination of  omissions and double counting may emerge if  different countries 
apply different combinations of  these criteria. Assume for example that country A 
allows for [(R) (x) (y)] (x= H or A; y=D or F) to be included in the M3(A) and 
country B does not care about the residence criterion, including in its -18--19-
M3(B) all monetary assets  denominated in the own currency held by domestic 
banks. The assets contained in M3(B) are therefore of  type [(z) (H) (D)], where (z) 
is  (R)  or (NR).  Omissions  in the  two-country  aggregate  appear to the  extend 
monetary assets of  residents in country B are held in foreign banks and/or foreign 
currencies. Moreover,  the assets held by residents of country A in country B and 
are denominated in the currency of  B are double counted. 
2.4.2 The one-criterion Principle 
Today, most Community countries practise a two-criteria definition, based on C 1 
and C2. It means that monetary aggregates in these countries contain assets of  type 
[(R) (H) (x)], where xis D or F.  Again,  aggregating these measures implies an 
omission consisting of  all monetary assets of  type (3) and (4) in diagram 3, i.e. all 
holdings held at banks located outside the country of  residence. 
Assume instead that all EC countries applied only the Residence criterion, and that 
the whole world consists of  the Community. Then, each national aggregate would 
be complete in the sense that all monetary assets held by residents would be regis-
tered,  irrespectively of currency of denomination and the location of the issuer 
(bank). Since agents cannot be residents in more than one country there is no risk 
of  double counting of  their holdings. In terms of  diagram 3, one country's statistics 
would cover assets (1)-(4), while (5)-(8) would be covered by the other countries. 
Under such circumstances, the European aggregate would be an accurate measure 
of the true monetary holdings by European non-bank residents.  This is also the 
basic message of  the expert group working for the Governors' Committee, namely 
that  "adding  up national  aggregates  across  countries  straightforwardly yields  a 
consistent and comprehensive Community-wide measure if  one, and only one, of 
the three criteria is applied in each and every country"  11• 
In conclusion,  the  delicate  process  of monetary targeting  presupposes  reliable 
statistics and the current situation forms a shaky point of departure. This is shown 
both in the next part of the paper, where the possible influence of the presently 
insufficient statistics on the estimated relationship between money and the ultimate 
variables  is  discussed,  and  in  part  three  where  the  process  of  monetary 
management based on national money is examined. 
2. 7 Summary and Conclusions 
The principal pros and cons for monetary targeting have been presented in the 
beginning of  part 2. In the context of  the EMU, the use of intermediate variables 
as targets, i.e. indicators of  the policy stance rather as indicators of  the economic 
conjuncture, will prove beneficial for the process of  monitoring the actions of  the 
ECB and for exercising central banking accountability. Regardless the choice of 
intermediate variable,  it has been argued that the optimal policy orientation is 
11 Governors Committe (1991), Annex S p.28. -20-
price stability, which in the case of the ECB has already been secured by the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
It has also been discussed whether a monetary aggregate  is the most suitable 
candidate for intermediate targeting. Assuming that: (1) the forces released by the 
process of completing the internal market are as strong as expected; (2) that the 
catching up efforts of the poor member states become more impetuous, and (3) 
that the political changes in Europe open new trade opportunities,  targeting a 
monetary aggregate can be seen as the optimal response to the anticipated chal-
lenges. These elements foreshadow an environment where real rather than finan-
cial disturbances will be predominant,  as  the  strong wave of financial  shocks 
which followed the financial deregulation of  the 1980s has abated. The presence 
of the latter shall nevertheless not be ignored, and the risks of a continual finan-
cial innovation will be further investigated in the next part. Moreover, the pos-
sibility of  targeting an area-wide aggregate before the third stage of  the EMU has 
been discussed, showing that it will have far-reaching consequences for the func-
tioning of  the exchange rate mechanism, the ERM. 
However, successful monetary targeting presupposes that several technical prob-
lems such as harmonisation of national monetary statistics find their solutions. 
This issue is further investigated in part 3 along with other technical conditions 
for a successful monetary management. But what above all is needed is a stable 
relationship between the area-wide aggregate and the ultimate targets,  an issue 
we now tum to. (4) 
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3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Using a European Monetary Aggregate (EMA) as intermediate target requires that 
a stable relationship exists between the monetary aggregate and the ultimate target, 
stabilization of  real output around the potential. This is another way of expressing 
what is set out in the Maastricht Treaty, namely "  ...  the primary objective of the 
ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice of price stability, it 
shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to con-
tributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in 
Article 2 of  this Treaty" 12. 
So, the first question one has to answer concerns the existence of a stable relation-
ship between the EMA, the intermediate target, and the ultimate targets, the infla-
tion rate or the potential output. 
Approaching the  empirical  studies  one  hopes  to  find  results  supporting  the  hy-
pothesis that not only a stable, but also a simple relationship for money demand 
exists. The additional constraint of simplicity can be justified by the fact that the 
estimated function will serve as a guide-line in decision-making. Allowing the set 
of explanatory variables to expand, in order to receive the best possible explana-
tory power, is probably the best choice for the ambitious econometrician but can-
not be optimal for the central banker. As the set of arguments expands, the use of 
the function as a basis for policy formulation may become cumbersome, since reli-
able forecasts for all variables involved are necessary. 
Artis (  1992) observes that "there have been two principal kinds of response to the 
perceived breakdown of such simple relationships. One has been to allow for more 
complex dynamics, or to set these on side whilst emphasising the stability of  long-
run relationships. The other has been to augment the long-run relationship itself''. 
There are many good examples of  the latter category, e.g. Hall, Henry and Wilcox 
(1989),  but their normative  importance  is  limited because  they  fail  to  meet the 
simplicity criterion, as the latter is conventionally perceived due to the influential 
work  ofFriedman-Schwarz (1963). 
The Bekx-Tulio ( 1987) study constitutes a good attempt in this direction. They es-
timated a relationship between the Community-wide narrow money (M  1  ), real in-
come, inflation, interest rates and the (current) exchange rate of  the ECU vis-a-vis 
the U.S.  dollar.  Besides a peculiar result concerning the coefficient of the price 
level, estimated significantly larger than unit, the model was reexamined by Krem-
ers and Lane (1990) and found misspecified as the Chow tests for parameter sta-
bility exposed that the whole function was unstable. However, repeating the exer-
cise with somewhat different model  specification and  controlling the  estimation 
process with a variety of sophisticated statistical tests, they find that a robust and 
stable relationship between the same variables exists. 
12 Article 2 states that the primary task of  the Community is "to promote a harmonious and balanced 
development of  economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the 
envorinment, a high degree of  convergence of  economic performance, a high level of  employment and 
of  social protection, the raising of  the standard of  living and quality of life, and economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States". -22-
Using the same specification as Kremers-Lane, Bomhoff (1992) took another step 
in checking the quality of  the previous estimates, and his finding reinforce the im-
pression that a stable and well-specified relationship is now available. Moreover, 
Bomhoff undertook some extensive tests for the forecastability of the income ve-
locity applying the Kalman-filtering technique,  using the long-term government 
bond  yield  as  explanatory  variable  and,  among  other  things,  he  finds  that 
"forecasting aggregate velocity for a community aggregate would have been easier 
than forecasting velocity in each country separately and adding forecasts". This is 
a comforting result which reinforces the impression that the ERM-wide relation-
ship possesses better qualities than that of most individual countries, and, at least, 
not worse for that of  Germany, which has been the most successful case in this re-
spect. 
Monticelli and Strauss-Kahn (1992) have reported similar results for broad money. 
Again,  what seems difficult to hold in individual ERM countries seems to hold 
quite well at the aggregate level. The ERM-wide demand for broad money is found 
to be "a stable function of income and interest rate (and the rate of change in the 
ECU-U.S. dollar exchange rate)". Even in this case, the results appear to be robust 
since they prove to be insensitive to changes in samples, techniques etc. 
There is one hypothesis which these papers put forward as a possible explanation 
for their remarkable findings. National monetary aggregates are probably affected 
by developments in other ERM-countries.  As  financial  markets  are  linked with 
highly correlated interest rates,  events in each and every member country may 
induce portfolio adjustment so that assets denominated in one currency are substi-
tuted by assets in other currencies and probably even issued by foreign institutions. 
Since part of these assets falls within the category of monetary assets, asset sub-
stitution implies even currency substitution and the behaviour of  national monetary 
aggregates  cannot be explained merely on the basis of other national variables. 
Such externalities are although "internalised" and counterbalanced at the aggregate 
level. This hypothesis is not unreasonable, because the period when most national 
aggregates behaved strangely, basically the period after the mid-1980's, coincides 
with the intensification of  the financial integration process. 
In conclusion, there should be no doubt that there is sufficient econometric evi-
dence that a stable relationship for both narrow and broad European money exists. 
The  crucial  question,  however,  is  whether these  findings  are  sufficient for the 
conclusion that all essential preconditions for monetary targeting exist. As a defi-
nite  answer to  this  question requires  that the  EMA  actually has  been used in 
monetary policies, any a priori appraisal of the ex ante econometric results must 
rest  on  hints  provided  by  an  investigation  of conditions  under  which  the 
econometric work has been done. For this purpose, the rest of this chapter is de-
voted to support three, probably very important, qualifications. First, there is good 
reason to believe that much of the good correlation between the variables must be 
attributed to the asymmetric nature of  the EMS, i.e. the prevailing system of fixed 
exchange rates during the later part of  the sampling period. The important question 
here is whether the estimate can be invariant to the symmetry/asymmetry aspect of 
the  fixed  exchange  rate  regime.  Second,  a  test is  needed  about  how our best 
guesses about fmancial  innovation in the future  will affect the  relationship.  Fi--23-
nally,  a warning about the robustness of the result must be raised, related to the 
fact that the relationship has been estimated before we started using the aggregate 
as a policy variable. 
3.1 The Influence of  the Present System 
As explained in section 2.5,  the  German dominance  in the EMS  is well docu-
mented in the existing literature. Although dominance is a badly defined concept, 
in its most frequent use it purports to reflect the fact that the Bundesbank, the 
German  Central  Bank,  is  anchoring  the  exchange  rate  mechanism  by setting 
explicit and achievable monetary targets, whereas the rest of the participants only 
try to keep fixed rates against the DM. 
The immediate consequence of  this order is that the money supply in the ten ERM 
"peripheral" countries has been completely determined by money demand, a direct 
implication of  the exchange rate targeting. Moreover, as explained in the appendix, 
fluctuations in real activity in these countries have been accommodated by more or 
less automatic adjustments in their money supply,  stemming from capital flows. 
Real shocks tend to be magnified because changes in real demand, ceteris paribus, 
are positively correlated with money demand, as it is supposed to be, tending to 
create interest rate differentials which induce capital inflows during booms and 
outflows during recessions.  Since the nature of the asymmetric  system does not 
allow sterilization of  the capital flows in the periphery, money supply must be very 
well correlated both with real output and inflation. 
The !,Symmetric nature of the ERM must therefore exert some influence in the 
explanatory power of  output and inflation on money supply, at least in the ten pe-
ripheral countries of the ERM, especially during the period between 1987-1992, 
when the system functioned without friction. 
On the other hand, the econometric stQ.dies  are supposed to answer the question 
whether there is an area-wide money demand function which endures the targeting 
procedure. Because non-targeted money is not equivalent to targeted money, the 
estimates explain the influence of inflation and output on money which has not 
been subjected to the manipulations of a central bank.  The !!Symmetric nature of 
the present exchange rate mechanism has therefore helped to explain things. Ac-
cordingly, a change to a symmetric regime, which occurs automatically if  the area-
wide  monetary  aggregate  is  targeted,  justifies the  suspicion that the  estimated 
functions give a too optimistic view of the possibilities to succeed better at the 
European level with what has been a failure at the individual countries. 13 
3.2 Currency Substitution 
In the world of international business, future payments in different currencies are 
effectively hedged by holdings counterbalancing liquid assets or liabilities in the 
13 Discusions with H.Matthes brought this aspect under my attention. See also Matthes (1993). -24-
same currencies.  For example,  to eliminate the exchange rate risk of an export 
(import) credit, one can borrow (invest) the same amount in the currency in which 
the future asset (liability) is denominated. More generally, optimal portfolio man-
agement in the international world of  today  usually takes the form of holding as-
sets denominated in a large amount of  different currencies. 
The process is facilitated by the computer and information technologies, allowing 
for quick reshuffling in portfolios on the basis of  new information and shifts in ex-
pectations. To the extend portfolios contain monetary assets, such rearrangements 
imply shifts in the demand for various monetaty assets,  usually not captured in 
national statistics. 
Substituting domestic monetary assets for monetary assets denominated in foreign 
currencies is called currency substitution. The phenomenon has probably increased 
in importance in recent time, as both the technological possibilities of receiving 
and processing information tend to make portfolio management more active and as 
the costs associated with asset substitution have been sharply trending downwards. 
As  an  effect,  when  private  actors  in  countries  with  deregulated  markets  hold 
monetary assets denominated in various  currencies and,  as explained in section 
2.6,  national  statistics  usually  do  not capture  assets  other than those  of more 
traditional  nature  suitable  for  closed  monetary  systems,  the  phenomenon  of 
currency substitution is liable to produce statistical problems in national money 
demand functions, of  continually larger significance. 
There is an additional source of  concern, associated with the ambition to make the 
European currencies closer, if  not perfect, substitutes, before the countries decide 
to proceed to the final  stage of the  EMU.  Generally, the closer substitutes the 
European currencies become, the stronger the expected shifts in national money 
demand functions should be. This is so because, when assets become more identi-
cal, small changes in the risk/return profile will induce significant asset substitu-
tion.  So,  increased  exchange  rate  stability  among  the  ERM  currencies,  itself 
strongly desired and necessary for the transition to the final stage of  the EMU, will 
certainly augment the instability in national money demand, unless the recommen-
dations of  the Committee of Governors to improve the routines of collecting data 
are followed. 
If  the only reason behind the observed instability in many national money demand 
functions were currency substitution, then the problem would disappear if  statistics 
were improved and definitions of  monetary assets followed the one criterion rule14• 
Moreover, McKinnon's idea that monetarism can be reinstated at a global level, 
asserting that global money demand is  stable  since  all problems  with currency 
substitution are internalised, would be vety attractive and,  adopting McKinnon's 
hypothesis, one could have a good explanation for the econometric results reported 
above. 15  Artis,  for  example,  asserts  that "it is  difficult to  see  how the  results 
obtained could have  any other explanation and,  on the face  of it,  Kremers  and 
Lane have already shown that Ml is in stable (and simple) demand at the Euro-
14 The one criterion rule is described in section 2.6. 
IS  See McKinnon (1982). -25-
pean level and could,  therefore,  make a highly suitable policy target for  Stage 
Three". 
However, the authors in all the studies mentioned in the previous section admit 
that the monetary assets involved in their estimates do not capture monetary assets 
held by non-residents, or issued by institutions located abroad.  With reference to 
the diagram 4.1 in section 2.6, the monetary assets do not include assets other than 
those of  type [(R) (H) (D)].  The rest is not included for statistical reasons16• What 
these omissions imply for the quality of the estimates is difficult to say, but it is 
fairly clear that, as intra-ERM cross border holdings and monetary assets issued by 
foreign institutes have been omitted, Artis'  conclusion seems a little bit premature, 
if  not irrelevant. 
3.3 Financial innovation 
Financial innovation has been  described and explained in so many different ways 
so as to make one quite sceptical about the analytical strength and robustness of 
the concept. First, it is fairly clear that it is both the cause and the effect of  finan-
cial (de)regulation.  Regulations,  if they are  binding,  distort relative  prices  and 
create pools of  unexploited rents which remain inaccessible unless instruments for 
circumventing them are invented. In other words,  there is always an incentive to 
undermine regulations and make them ineffective.  For example,  capital controls 
became ineffective and abolished sooner than otherwise in some countries when 
well-functioning future markets hollowed out the monetary autonomy they were 
supposed to protect. This the so called "constraints' theory" of financial innova-
tion. At the same time, a generally accepted view among economists is that liberal-
ised markets provide the most favourable conditions for innovative activity. 
Second, fmancial innovation has been presented as a process driven by the avail-
ability of  new technologies and as a process propelled by a strong demand for new 
assets.  This is  so because investors are  always  seeking more effective ways to 
hedge their portfolios, or to make portfolio management more flexible. The strong 
development in computer technology during the two last decades have drastically 
lowered the transaction and information costs. It also enhanced market transpar-
ency.  Instruments requiring complex operations in order to become  practically 
useful,  like  swaps  and options,  although  conceptually always  feasible,  did not 
come into day-to-day use unless the computer technology reduced  the calculation 
work to a simple routine. Moreover, new information is now instantly processed 
and disseminated through prices in global markets, which probably boosted the li-
quidity in the trade for some instruments. Extrapolating these trends, Artis (1992) 
draws the important conclusion that "at a fundamental level, computerization of-
fers  the prospect ultimately of the  disappearance of money:  with instantaneous 
clearing, alternative earning assets can be liquidated on the spot to finance trans-
actions and the need to hold money in advance of  expenditure will vanish". 
16 The ECU/U.S. dollar exchange rate involved in the estimated equations aim just at capturing currency 
substitution between the holdings in European currencies and dollar denominated assets. The intra-ERM 
holdings are however missed. -26-
Whatever the underlying forces might be, financial innovation is of  practical inter-
est because it affects the manageability of the monetary instruments and the effi-
~  of  monetary policies. Even if it takes some time for exchange of non-mone-
tary assets to become equally efficient as means of payment as money, the trans-
action-demand for money is bound to decline, to the extend new assets can be used 
for the same purpose. Undoubtedly, the stability for especially broad money de-
mand is eroded by this kind of asset substitution, if the measure does not expand 
continuously to encompass new categories of  financial assets. De Boissieu ( 1992) 
finds additional reasons for why this process may affect money demand, consisting 
of  what he calls contribution and indirect effects. The former describes vaguely ef-
fects on the savings ratio, resulting from enhanced possibilities for financial diver-
sification. The idea is that if savings become less risky, ceteris paribus,  the de-
mand for total savings increase. The latter is perceived to reflect the influence of 
sophisticated hedging and risk management techniques on the usual determinants 
of  money demand, such as income, interest rates and wealth. 
Securitization is another particularly interesting phenomenon of financial innova-
tion, bringing to our attention the potential changes in the role of financial inter-
mediaries, the banks. This is another concept encircling a broad range of market 
tendencies. In general terms, it describes the increased, in both absolute and rela-
tive terms,  direct borrowing through capital markets, by issuing marketable debt 
instruments. In more specialised use the term describes the process of selling out 
of  previously illiquid bank loans, transformed to marketable instruments. This is a 
somewhat surprising trend since banks in traditional monetary theory were thought 
of as institutions specialised in risk evaluation, assuming that most industrial and 
other investment projects involved idiosyncratic rather than systematic or market 
risk, i.e. risk that can be priced appropriately. 
More modem literature has also modelled banks as an invention pooling real risks, 
i.e.  an insurance system for savers (e.g.  Diamond-Dybvig (1983)).  It is still too 
early to appraise the consequences and the sustainability of the disintermediation 
process experienced during the  1980's but, if the trend holds, not only the asset 
side of  the banking sector but also money, its statistical counterpart, will certainly 
become a blunt approximation of total credit expansion and real activity. If  so, 
securitization  constitutes  another  threat  to  the  relationship  on  basis  of which 
monetary policies are formulated.  Again, this is probably most alarming for the 
present measures of  broad money, conceived as best correlated with total financial 
wealth and real activity.  This trend suggests also that total liabilities of  the central 
banks, the monetary base, may be relatively more stable but,  as stated in chapter 
1,  the better controllability of this aggregate does not compensate for its remote-
ness from the ultimate variables. 
Another interesting issue, addressed in Boissieu (1992) is whether the ongoing fi-
nancial integration in Europe will accelerate or retard the process of financial in-
novation and its effects. First, there will be a continuous supply of new technolo-
gies, partly a by-product of the rapid development of the computer industry, and 
hence not expected to abate. Second, the increased need of  prudential supervision 
and control, a side-effect of  financial globalisation, is expected to induce a wave of 
innovations  in  order  to  circumvent  these  controls.  This  is  in  line  with  the -27-
"constraints' theory", mentioned above. Third, continuing deregulation, necessary 
for further integration, enhances the scope for fmancial innovation as the process 
is, to a certain degree, self-generating. At last, in the wake of  integration we expect 
invigorated competition and probably the problem of overcapacity.  The need of 
survival will certainly be one of  the strongest driving forces. 
In conclusion, financial innovation entails several risks for the stability of  the rela-
tionship between money and ultimate targets. Lower transaction costs for clearing 
based on heterogeneous assets,  continuing inclusion of new assets in portfolios, 
outright asset  substitution as  non-monetary instruments become more  attractive 
than monetary assets and securitization, imply several risks for the control and the 
efficacy of monetary policies based on simple monetary targeting.  These trends 
will probably affect most of the parameters encountered in both money demand 
and money multiplier functions. 
3.4 The Target Problem 
Any  comparisons  between national  and  ERM-wide  aggregates  with  respect  to 
stability and other properties must take into account one fundamental difference. 
In contrast with national measures,  the European monetary aggregate is nothing 
but an estimate, never used for any purpose in monetary policies. A wide-spread 
and theoretically well-founded opinion among monetary theorists is that the major 
threat of instability and breakdown of an otherwise good relationship comes from 
the very fact that a particular aggregate is used as a target. 
As already mentioned, the phenomena of  financial innovation and currency substi-
tution reflect an activity whose purpose is to better hedge private portfolios. From 
the private point of view, monetary policies constitute a disturbance and it should 
be surprising if  the inventive abilities of  the market did not focus on  keeping out 
any kind of  undesired influence from monetary authorities. This is in accordance 
with the "theory of constraints", and  as a corollary to this approach, the demand 
for instruments capable to prevent the influence of monetary policies on private 
portfolios must be stronger the more active and "surprising" monetary policies are. 
This observation suggests also that there might be an additional reason, besides the 
traditional credibility argument, for why monetary authorities should be strongly 
disinclined to violate the fundamental constraint of stability in policy rules and, 
acting in pure self-interest, to curtail their own discretionary power to a minimum. 
On top of the lack-of-credibility cost there is probably even a lack-of-ability cost, 
growing when monetary authorities are suspected to serve goals other than price 
stability or when, for some other reasons,  inflation becomes of more disruptive 
nature and monetary policies must be "overactivated" in order to master it. 
This is probably the explanation for the survival of monetary targeting  in Ger-
many.  It is widely recognised that financial innovation has been much slower in 
Germany than in other parts of the world. Issing ( 1992) asserts that "in Germany 
the fmancial system would appear to have been less in need of  innovation". This is 
of  course a diplomatic way of  expressing the fact that deregulation did not proceed -28-
with the same pace as in other countries.17 This should be a part of  the truth. There 
is reason to believe that if  financial markets were really constrained by the policies 
of the Bundesbank, remaining regulations should become ineffective,  as  it hap-
pened in other parts of  the world. Thus, believing that markets posses this ability, 
the incentives must have been rather weak and a possible explanation for the stag-
nant financial climate might be the stable monetary climate, at least until recently. 
If  so, the recent inflationary episode with the attending mobilization in order to 
achieve the monetary target constitutes a sustainability test for the long-run  sta-
bility18. 
In conclusion, monetary aggregates are probably not as flexible as one is led to 
believe according to traditional literature. Current use reduces probably the pos-
sibility of using them successfully in the future.  The practical importance of this 
view is that it may be of  critical importance for the actual stability of  the estimated 
money demand functions that the member countries do not hand over to the ECB a 
situation requiring active policies from the outset. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Ex-ante econometric stability is not equivalent to ex-post stability.  Stated differ-
ently, econometric stability is necessary but not sufficient.  Currency substitution 
and financial  innovation are  phenomena that undennine the relationship  in the 
long-run. One hypothesis put forward in section 3.4 is that the speed by which this 
erosion takes place may depend on the actual use of  the estimated relationships in 
decision-making. Hence, the degree of ex post stability will be gradually revealed 
in the course of  the trial and error process that starts as soon as the ECB targets the 
aggregate. 
17 According to Svensson (1992), German households and small and medium-sized firms have no 
substantial alternative to bank saving. Hence, the opportunities for asset substitutiton, e.g. between bank 
saving and private bonds or various types of  funds are small, which contributes to stability in the money 
demand function. 
18 In Switzerland, another good example of  a low-inflation economy with succesful monetary policies, 
the stable relationship between the targetted "Seasonally Adjusted Monetary Base" collapsed in the wake 
of  the inflationary episode during the second half of  the 1980's. -29-
4 MONETARY MANAGEMENT 
An interesting but also very difficult question is how the principle of subsidiarity 
can be applied in the operation of  the ESCB. There are several sources of  concern. 
First, there is the problem of achieving consensus in the Governing Board on the 
monetary target, given that its members represent countries either with different 
needs,  due to unsynchronized business cycles,  or different preferences vis-a-vis 
inflation  or both.  This  aspect  is  treated  in  section  4 .1.  Second,  there  is  an 
unanswered but institutionally very important question concerning the role existing 
central banks will be assigned to play in monetary management.  Questions like 
who will make the Open Market Operations, how actions can be best coordinated 
in order to achieve the common target and how to act in order to deliver clear mes-
sages about policy intentions, are good examples of issues pertinent to the second 
aspect.  Section 4.2 is devoted to these aspects. 
4.1  Setting the Target 
If  output fluctuations across the Community were perfectly correlated, there would 
be no problem in setting a target that stabilises the european economy. However, it 
is well-documented that business cycles are not synchronised, which implies that 
the thrust of the common monetary policy is bound to be  stimulative for some 
economies and contractive for other. Moreover, there will be a bias in the system 
insofar the output of the major economies will dominate in the composite output 
index, and therefore better correlated with it.  As a result, monetary policies will 
not be distributionally neutral at the various phases of a business cycle, to the ex-
tend real activity in some minor economies will nc~ p~rfectly correlate with the 
dominant economies, essentially Gennany, France and U.K  .. 
The problem should not be over-emphasized though, because such differences will 
net out over a business cycle, and will probably disappear unless some structural 
features in these economies do not produce a systematic lack of synchronization. 
This  can be the  case  with  big  oil-producers,  because  oil  shocks  normally  are 
detrimental for most european economies but beneficial to them.  But according to 
the  optimum  currency area literature,  this  type  of economies  are  not the  best 
candidates for the EMU. They are not so many either and, if their participation is 
based on other benefits,  e.g.  political,  then the  costs  of non-tailored monetary 
policies must has been discounted in the decision to participate in the monetary 
union.  But this  might  rather be  the  exception  than  the  rule.  In nonnal  cases, 
common policies should bring convergence in business cycles. 
One mechanism which may help to bring the business cycle of deviating  small 
economies more in phase with that of larger economies might be the stabilizing 
development of production  costs.  Assume  for  example  a  small  open  economy 
whose business cycle is not in phase with the bulk of the Community. The com-
mon monetary policy is therefore liable to exert inflationary pressure on the small 
economy during "global" recessions whereas it will tend to be disinflationary when 
policy becomes  tight during  "global"  booms.  Thus,  the  competitiveness  of the 
small economy will tend to  fluctuate  countercyclically, with rising costs during -30-
"global"  recessions  and improved  competitiveness  during  "global"  booms.  The 
countercyclical fluctuations in competitiveness will therefore mitigate the procyc-
lical impact of monetary policies and, if  competitiveness is of greater importance 
than monetary policies for profit, it is likely that the private sector will quickly 
adjust to the new realities. 
That depends among other things on the importance of the intra-community trade, 
i.e. the degree of  its integration with the common market. If  this trade is important, 
the incentives to hold back costs  during  "global"  recessions  will be  dominant. 
Moreover, if  the economy is well integrated with the rest of  the community, there 
is no reason for the business cycle to be deviating. To the extent it happens today 
must depend on deviating domestic policies, and this source of distortion will be 
removed when policies will be better co-ordinated. 
In conclusion, if the members of the Governing Council of the ECB are prepared 
to  support policies  aiming  at  low  and  stable  global  inflation,  the  problem  of 
fmding a target which is not destabilizing for any economy will become trivial as 
time  passes.  However,  at  this  point  it  should  be  worth  investigating  another 
possibility, related to the preferences of  the members of  the Governing Council. 
Assuming that inflation is a monotone function of money supply,  agreeing on a 
target for money supply automatically means that a simultaneous decision about 
the inflation rate has been taken.  Looking at the inflationary record of the candi-
dating countries, it is not difficult to fmd support for the suspicion that the Govern-
ing Council,  the  body entrusted to fonnulate  the  policy orientation and whose 
members  will  be the  governors  of the  national  central  banks,  will  not be  as 
monolithic in terms of preferences  as  the  Gennan Bundesbank,  whose  statutes 
served as a model for those of the ECB.  Even if the members of the Governing 
Council are not supposed to take national interests into consideration, the theoreti-
cal possibility that this can happen makes some authors quite sceptical about the 
political independence of the ECB,  and see the presence of national representa-
tives as an Achilles' heel in the proposed composition of  the ECB.19 Hence, facing 
the eventuality of diverging notions about what might be the appropriate inflation 
under various circumstances, it is worth investigating the costs that, at least theo-
retically, can be associated with the institutional weakness of  the ECB. 
First we have the Barro-Gordon (1983) type of  credibility costs.20 What will be the 
private  actors'  expectations,  given  that low- and high-inflation preferences  are 
mixed in the decision-making? If markets believe that the high inflation countries 
have given up any ambitions to influence monetary policies, the expectations will 
of  course be in line with the low inflation preferences. This is not unlikely to hap-
pen, because the convergence criteria ensure nominal convergence before the crea-
tion of the EMU. However, the problem is whether this procedure is sufficient to 
convince market participants that a change in preferences has taken place.  It is 
possible that good inflationary perfonnance under some years can be interpreted as 
an effort to pass the entrance criteria rather than as  an evidence of a  structural 
19 See for example Tarkka-Akerholm (1992). 
2o This issue is treated in detail in De Grauwe (1992). -31-
change in preferences. If  the latter happens, the countries with low inflation pref-
erences can either accept facts and live with unnecessarily high inflation or, they 
must be prepared to pay with unnecessarily high unemployment for a time in order 
to re-establish market expectations at a lower level. Again, how can they convince 
the high inflation partners to accept disinflationary policies? 
Arranging the  participating  countries  according  to  their  (revealed)  preferences, 
median desired inflation is probably the one which secures majority in the Govern-
ing Board. In such a case, it should be a cost associated with targeting median in-
flation, born both by the countries situated on the "left" and the "right" side of the 
target. For high inflation countries there should be a cost in terms of asset defla-
tion, loss of inflation tax and higher taxes, just to mention some of the classical 
costs that must be born in order to establish a low inflation equilibrium. For low 
inflation countries there is a cost in terms of  living with the risk of  moving towards 
a high inflation equilibrium. 
Taking monetary equivalences of  these costs, one can easily establish a compensa-
tion scheme  whereby lower inflation can be bought. If  low inflation countries 
compensate  high  inflation  countries  for  their  fiscal  and  other  losses,  a  new 
majority can move the inflation target from the median position towards the low-
inflation end of the spectrum. In pure economics terms, the fmal position depends 
on the marginal rate of substitution between money and inflation costs for the net 
contributors,  and the marginal rate of substitution between money and the low 
inflation costs  for the net recipients. 21 
The cynical world of  bargaining for side payments, like the one described above, is 
an integral part of the second best solutions one has to live with when political 
constraints are imposed on institutions whose task is to conduct sound economic 
policies. From this point of view, the Maastricht Treaty and the realisation of the 
EMU involve such compromises. The cohesions funds can very well be interpreted 
in these terms.  They are net transfers to countries which are supposed to bear a 
high convergence cost. The more traditional structural funds had almost the same 
purpose, namely to help poor member states to catch-up. In pure economic terms, 
they are nothing but a substitute for non-differentiated voting power, so that the 
preferences which are most compatible with the final goal can break through. In 
the present case, the ultimate target is to replicate the previous performance of the 
Bundesbank,  and  this  must  be  achieved  under  the  constraint  that  German 
preferences weight as much as the preferences of  the rest. 
In conclusion, the credibility aspect of  monetary policies suggests that the problem 
of achieving the ultimate target is not only a technical one.  A decision must be 
taken by the Governing Council of the ECB and the presence of heterogeneous 
preferences, to the extent they are heterogeneous, may prove problematic. There is 
good reason to believe that the correlation between money supply and inflation is 
not invariant to the expectations of the market participants about the underlying 
21 Tarkka-Akerholm (1992) provide a formal model of a compensation scheme, able to secure 
unanimous decisions in the Governing Board. Unanimity is however a stronger constraint than the 
prescribed majority rule in the Maastricht treaty. -32-
preferences. In the case of the ECB, the side-payment equilibrium may be time-
variant, as the marginal utility of  money is not time-invariant. 
4.2 Monetary Control 
We tum now to the second aspect of subsidiarity, namely the tasks to be assigned 
to  the  National  Central  Banks,  hereafter NCBs,  in the  process  of controlling 
money supply and executing OMOs. Two models will be examined, the so called 
the decentralised or three-tier model and the centralised or two-tier model,  both 
being in the core of economists' interest after their first appearance in the Delors 
Report and, of  course, the Maastricht Treaty.  22,23 
Diagram 5.1 depicts simplified versions of the two models, focusing on the most 
interesting features for the present purpose. As shown in the diagram, there are 
two important differences.  First, in the tree-tier system the ECB tries to control 
money creation indirectly, by imposing reserve requirements on the National Cen-
tral Banks (NCBs), whereas in the centralised (two-tier) system the ECB exerts di-
rect influence on the assets of the money creation institutes,  the deposit banks 
(DBs). Second, and partly as a consequence of the previous feature, exchange of 
reserves in the ECB-Funds market takes places at the level where the reserve re-
quirements apply, that is between NCBs in the decentralised model and between 
DBs in the centralised one. 
The appearance of an ECB Funds market is an important complement to the re-
serve requirement instrument, because it constitutes the most effective way of dif-
fusing existing liquidity in the ESCB-area and, without good possibilities of  redis-
tributing local surpluses and deficits,  monetary policy is bound to have tremen-
dous  distributional  effects.  An  efficient  payment  system  must  hencefore  be 
underpined with a well-functioning market for ECB Funds, essentially a clearing 
system guaranteeing smooth exchange of ECU-denominated assets held with the 
ECB. 
According to the decentralised or the 3-tier system, the ECB seeks to control the 
area-wide money supply by imposing reserve requirements on the national central 
banks. As indicated in box diagram 4.1, each member central bank will hold a part 
of  its assets at an account with the ECB, whose size can be completely determined 
by changes  on reserve  requirements.  They correspond  to  reserve  requirements 
some  central banks  apply to  deposit banks  within their respective jurisdictions 
today. As is the case with traditional national monetary systems, any increase in 
reserve requirements increases the total liabilities of  the central bank, the monetary 
base, but it slows down credit expansion and deposits,  i.e.  monetary expansion. 
Similarly,  any increase in the liabilities of the ECB  vis-a-vis a  national central 
bank has to be backed by a commensurate decrease of other assets in the national 
22 Gros (1991) Gros-Thygesen (1992) and Kenen (1992) provide good analytical descriptions of  them. 
The terms centralised/decentralised are used by Kenen whilst Gros and Gros-Thygesen prefer to describe 
strongly overlapping ideas with the terms two/three tier system, first encountered in the Delors Report. 
23 Extracts from the Delors Report presenting the original ideas are found in the annex to this chapter . -33--34-
central bank's account, basically the provision of  funds to commercial banks. This, 
in tum, induces banks to cut down deposits basically by means of more restricted 
lending policies. Equivalently, if the central bank sells bonds, commercial banks 
will finance the increased holdings of government debt by cutting down commer-
cial loans. 
In conclusion, higher reserve requirements on NCBs under the decentralised model 
should, ceteris paribus, imply a monetary contraction. Inherent to this system is, of 
course, that OMOs are executed by the national central banks.  Whether deposit 
banks located abroad (but within the ESCB-area) will be allowed to participate in 
such tenders or not is not clear, and the consequences of  alternative scenarios will 
be examined later. 
According to the centralised system or the 2-tier system, the ECB tries to control 
money creation directly at the source,  i.e.  by imposing reserve requirements  on 
banks.  It is  not  impossible  that  such  reserve  requirements  can  co-exist  with 
national ones,  to the  extent national  central banks want to use  this instrument. 
Apparently, the OMOs will be executed by the ECB and the national central banks 
may be allowed to play a secondary role in the process, for example by collecting 
the bids from domestic institutions. Total deposits and money supply in a genuine 
2-tier system are influenced by the control ECB has on its liability side, assumed 
to be as good as that of  existing national central banks. 
Naturally,  at the  fmal  stage of the  EMU,  especially after the  introduction of a 
common currency, the centralised system is the only feasible. One of  the questions 
addressed in this chapter is whether this transition could possibly be smooth, i.e. in 
several stages, or it is preferable to have a sudden, bing-bang transition. As seen in 
the attached quotation,  the Maastricht Treaty leaves this question open, allowing 
the co-existence of both models and going back to the Delors Report, where the 
early ideas about the EMU are found, we fmd three different approaches. Ciampi 
( 1989) proposes a genuine decentralised system,  Thygesen ( 1989) fmds the idea 
quite attractive but also "unduly confining" as a model for stage three, for which 
he advocates the 2-tier system,  while Lamfalussy (1989) suggests a cooperative 
solution according to which existing central banks create a common subsidiary to 
start with, acting as  a proxy for the ECB  but whose authority is granted by the 
existing central banks.  Relevant parts of their papers are quoted in the annex to 
this chapter. 
4.2.1 European Money and National Monies 
National money is defined as the part of a national monetary system's liabilities 
comprising currency (CU) and deposits, demand deposits (DD) for narrow money 
and even other deposits for different measures of broad money.  Since liabilities 
and assets always balance, the asset side of  the consolidated balance sheet also re-
flects national money. Box 4.1  provides schematic balance sheets for the institu-
tions involved in the ESCB, namely the NCBs, the DBs and the ECB. Aggregating 
NCBs and the DBs operating in their respective jurisdictions, we receive a national 
monetary system whose assets/liabilities represent national money and, -35--36-
aggregating  all  national monetary systems  along  with the  ECB,  we  receive  the 
European Monetary System, whose assets/liabilities should be the EMA. 
There  are  two  important  observations  that  can be  made  on  the  basis  of these 
balance sheets.  First,  as indicated in the box,  the balance sheets are  constructed 
according  to  the  decentralised  or  the  3-tier  system.  This  is  so  because  the 
institutions which hold reserves at the ECB are the NCBs. However, when NCBs 
and  DBs  are  aggregated  at the  national  level,  the  institution keeping  reserves 
becomes immaterial. It is the national monetary system which owns the assets held 
in account with the ECB. Thus, ex post money, i.e. the actual money produced by 
the system and registered in the balance sheets, is invariant to the choice of the 
institution whose liabilities are subjected to reserve requirements. 
The second observation has to do with the normative status of the reserves owned 
by each national monetary system.  Aggregating on the European level,  the  total 
assets consisting of  these reserves net out with the liabilities of the ECB vis-a-vis 
each NCB.  It means  that the  ex post EMA  is  invariant to  the distribution of 
reserves among the national monetary systems. For example, if  NCBA borrows 
reserves  from  NCBB  in the  context of the  decentralised  system,  the  balance  of 
NCBB with the ECB will decrease and the balance of NCBA increase but the total 
assets  of the  ESCB  will remain  unchanged.  Accordingly,  there  is  no  reason to 
attach what Kenen  (1992)  calls  "a normative  importance"  to  the  central banks' 
balances with the ECB. 
The only conclusion that can drawn from these observations is that ex post money 
is invariant to the institutional differences of the two alternative models. Hence, if 
any differences exist, they must be found rather in the possibilities of controlling 
the process of money creation and of  monitoring the development of the monetary 
aggregate.  In other words, we proceed by investigating the  ex ante properties of 
the two models. 
As already mentioned, at the pure accounting level national money in principle can 
be considered as a simple component of  the EMA. According to this approach, the 
EMA, the European money supply ME is simply defined as the sum of  the realised 
money supply in member countries Mi, where  i=1,  ... ,12.  In principle, the EMA 
could  also  be  defined without  any  reference  to  national  statistics,  simply  as  a 
bundle of  relevant financial assets held by European actors. It would be possible to 
go this way, if detailed financial data were available. Obviously, if  these two ways 
of accounting were  equivalent,  the  relationship  between national  and  area-wide 
money  would  be  clearly  additive,  i.e.  ME=  "f.Mi,  where  i=1, ... 12.  There  are, 
however, good reasons to believe that the relationship is not additive if  the EMA is 
defined independently of the  sum,  i.e.  according to  some economic criteria,  and 
the  rest of the  section is devoted to  demonstrate  the  pitfalls of adding  national 
money. 
In order to keep track with definitions and variables, we put down the components 
of  national aggregates: -37-
From the Asset Side  From the Liability Side 
Money(M)= 
Deposits at ECB [(ECB)DEP]  [  J 
+  __  Currency+Outside Banks (CU) 
Foreign Assets (FA) 
+  Demand Deposits (DD) 
Domestic Credit (DC) 
M=(ECB)DEP+FA+DC  M=CU+DD 
Besides these definitions, it is usual to connect the total liabilities of  the monetary 
system,  i.e.  money, with the liabilities of the central bank (monetary base, H), 
using the money multiplier equationM=mH.24 
What will be particularly examined in the next three subsections is whether it is 
desirable to keep the national monetary aggregates alive. The only reason for why 
national monetary aggregates would continue to exist might be that the ECB tries 
to control the EMA, the European total, through its national parts. But as will be 
clear in the sequel, there are several reasons for not following this procedure. First, 
national statistics suffer from inconsistencies, making the sum of  national monies a 
bad image of  the actual EMA. Second, capital flows among member countries may 
not be neutral with respect to the aggregate. Finally, keeping the national monetary 
systems alive  in a  decentralised or a  quasi-decentralised framework may prove 
detrimental to the parallel effort of  promoting financial integration. 
4.2.2  Statistical Inconsistencies 
Utilising traditional concepts, a European Monetary Aggregate,  hereafter EMA, 
should be nothing but the aggregate  liabilities  of the  ESCB,  i.e.  the  liabilities 
found in the consolidated balance sheet of the national central banks, the deposit 
banks  and the  ECB.  So if national  aggregates  were  consistently  defined,  they 
should sum up to an aggregate that mirrors the actual liabilities of  the ESCB. 
One problem with this particular aggregation is that traditionally defined national 
money  suffers  from  statistical  inconsistencies.  As  explained  in  section  2.6, 
national monetary aggregates  are  not harmonised and existing,  quite  arbitrary, 
national definitions do not capture all monetary assets in an appropriate way. For 
example monetary assets such as demand deposits held by foreigners on accounts 
with domestic banks are not included in many national aggregates.  Thus, to the 
24 Simple manipulation of  the definition the monetary base  H=CU+RE,  where CU is currency in circulation 
andRE the reserves of  the banking sector, gives the traditional money multiplier equation: 
CU+RE  CUin,n+REID,n  cu+re  CC!fr  REJf  . 
H=  M=  flu  /Lu M=--M, wherecu=  andre=  . Defimngthemoney 
M  CUI  +1  1+cu  DD  DD 
/DD 
multiplier as m = 1  +  cu , we get M = mH, where m > 1 because reserves are only a small fraction of deposits 
re+cu -38-
extend many European residents are treated as foreigners in national statistics a 
monetary aggregate derived as a sum of existing national aggregates is liable to 
omissions,  consisting of  all cross-boarder monetary holdings within the ECB area. 
A similar problem arises because of a another practice in many countries, namely 
the practice of  excluding monetary assets denominated in foreign currencies, even 
if  they are held by residents in domestic banks. 
On the other hand,  there is a risk of duplication if  one country includes in its 
national statistics monetary holdings of  its residents held at banks abroad, and the 
statistics of the country where this asset is issued (e.g.  a bank account) includes 
assets held by foreigners. If  the foreigner is a Community resident, these assets 
will be counted twice, once in the country of  residence and once in the country of 
the bank issuing the asset. 
In  conclusion,  a  far-reaching  hannonization  of national  statistics  is  necessary 
before national aggregates sum up to a fairly good European aggregate. As already 
suggested by the  Governors'  Committee,  the  ideal  should be that all  countries 
apply one and only one criterion in their national statistics, the residence of the 
holder criterion. Such a reform should bring consistence in existing statistics but it 
requires quite radical changes in reporting routines. This statistical problem would 
however, disappear if  the intermediate stage of national aggregates were skipped 
and all European deposit banks reported directly to the ECB.  Doing it this way 
would imply that monetary data could not only be more accurate but also more 
timely. The EMIIECB can start targeting a European aggregate without waiting the 
completion of  the hannonization of  national data. 
4.2.3 Non-neutral Capital Flows 
Another problem created by national aggregates is that their sum, the EMA, may 
be unstable as an effect of  capital flows among the participating countries. This is 
because money multipliers  can be of different  size.  To  demonstrate  the  point, 
assume that Europe (E) consists of only two countries, A and B, and the target of 
ECB is based on narrow money, Mi (i= E, A, B). 
M E  =MA  MB =  AHA  BHB =  I+cuA  HA  I+~ HB  +  m  +m  .-A  __ _A  +  .JJ  B 
re  +cu  re  +cu 
If  mA =  mB =  m, then a capital flow, say from country B to country A has no effect 
on  the  European  aggregate,  because  AME =  m( +  Ml  14  - MIB) =  0.  Apparently, 
AME  -:~; 0 if  the multipliers are not equal, and the difference may lie on the reserve 
ratios rtl, on the currency to deposit ratios cu;, or on both. In case cu14  =  cuB =  cu, 
things  become  very  simple  because  hannonizing  the  reserve  requirements  is 
sufficient  for  neutralising  all  effects  stemming  from  capital  flows.  In  case 
cu14  -:~; cuB,  hannonization of reserve requirements  is  not a  sufficient instrument, 
and monetary control requires partial strerilization of the capital flows.  The latter 
must of course be based on reliable estimates of the money multipliers involved. -39-
Obviously,  the  case  should become more  complicated if  M3  rather than Ml is 
targeted, because more parameters would appear in the money multipliers. 
The immediate reflexion one makes on basis of  these observations is, again,  that it 
would be preferable to skip the intermediate level of  monetary control. As a matter 
of  fact, the possible effects of capital flows would be completely internalised and 
brought under control without bothering about which particular capital movement 
took place and if  there is a need for partial sterilization. Every tendency for money 
supply  to  increase would be  automatically detected if  deposit banks  held their 
reserves in accounts with the ECB.  Since increased money supply is identical to 
increased private deposits and part of  the latter has to be kept as reserve money at 
the  ECB,  a  statistically  closed  system  would  be  in  operation,  making  the 
monitoring function simple and efficient. 
One possibility of  making the decentralised system tractable from the control point 
of  view is to try to steer the asset side of  the monetary aggregates. As shown in the 
definitions above,  each national central bank has three categories  of assets,  but 
only one is automatically controlled by the ECB, namely the reserves the NCBs 
are obliged to hold in accounts with the ECB. This is, however, not sufficient for 
complete monetary control, because the composition of the other two assets,  i.e. 
foreign assets and domestic credit, should matter to the extend money multipliers 
differ,  as  explained  above.  If,  however,  the  domestic  counterpart  of national 
money  is  also  restricted  by  allotments  decided  by  the  ECB,  then  the  task  of 
sterilising capital flows to appropriate extend is also decentralised, and the whole 
system becomes more functional. For example, a rapid expansion of private credit 
in high multiplier countries, owing to capital inflows, can be prevented to exceed 
certain limits if  the central bank undertakes open market sales of government debt. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of open market operations in national markets can 
also be questioned if financial markets do not operate on a national basis,  as the 
next subsection purports to highlight. 
4.2.4 Open Market Operations and Leaking National Monetary Systems 
Presently, there exist well-functioning markets for reserve money in every member 
state,  but not at the  Community  level.  In other words,  the  markets  for  central 
banks'  money are segmented. This is not a problem as long as monetary policies 
are in the hands of the NCBs, but the existence of an integrated market for ECB-
Funds  is  one  of the  necessary  conditions  for  a  successful  centralisation  of 
monetary responsibilities at the level of  the ECB. Without this market, diffusion of 
liquidity across the  Community is  hampered as  local  excess liquidity cannot be 
smoothly channelled to institutions with excess demand. 
Lack of an  ECB-Funds market has  some  implications for  the  way open market 
operations can be executed. Since the instrument is used to  affect total liquidity, 
the optimal area for central bank money must be identical with the area for which 
a liquidity target is set. Targeting a European monetary aggregate should therefore 
imply  the  obligation  of organising  and  developing  the  market  for  central  bank 
money. Again, two alternatives exist. -40-
The first is that the ECB-Fund market exists only for exchange of funds among 
NCBs, and the only reason for such an arrangement might be that NCBs are also 
used for orchestrated implementation of monetary policies, which fits  well with 
the probable ambition to preserve a decentralised system.  In effect,  the various 
NCBs will seek to affect local liquidity the traditional way,  i.e.  by buying and 
selling  appropriate amounts of government debt.  At the  other extreme we can 
think of a completely centralised system in which the ECB implements its OMOs 
directly, by choosing among a small number of primary dealers operating in the 
major financial centres. 
Since the purpose of OMOs is to affect total liquidity and the task of allocating it 
among potential users rests upon the financial markets,  it is quite instructive to 
investigate how the interaction of different markets determines the ultimate effect 
of monetary policies.  For the  present purpose  it is  sufficient to focus  on two 
markets, the market for commercial credit and the more fundamental ECB-Funds 
market, and table 4.1 can serve as a guide-line for the following discussion. 
Financial markets have been segmented but they move quickly towards complete 
integration. Markets for central bank money are however still segmented, but an 
integrated ECB-Funds market must be established as  soon as the targeting of a 
common aggregate takes effect.  Thus, the original position has been (D) and the 
ambition is to move to (A).  Meanwhile, we are probably between (D) and (C), 
heading towards (C). 
Table 4.1: Possible financial market situations 
:-.::-:-:  _:·::·:.-·:.:-·-·.;  •,  -··;  ..  ·.· ..  ::·:·-= 
.  -.:.-:--.:.-.:  :: 





.·.  :-::  _ _ .--.::·:::: 
:::· ..  :::.:'::!:;::::'·!:'::::;·.;:::.';::;:·£iire~~~~~t~~P:~!~~·;:I!!.I~!::t··.::i:::::_;·:!:·:.:::.:;;::,:::·:.:::::·-::;::::::. 
;~1Uilt
1~~l!tl  !lml'!!li!!l!  ;~ 
·::=  -._:·-. 
•.:.:.:.'·.:·:·:·:·:·::·!t.  ..•.  ar.:·:··~.·:. ;r  ..  ·,···~.·•••••  .. ·••••·u·  '. I  )1.  .... ......  '  + ....... . 
:  .·:- .;·.··  :·::::.:.:::::::::,::.·:-·:::::.:::.·:·:.;:-:: ...  :·:  ·.::;,); 
,  .. ::·::::: :::;:::::.:::::::::.::::::::·::::=-...  ·.  ···: ·: ... ·  ·  · ·  . : ·:-.  ..-:  .  ·.  ·  ... =.· ·  :  .. :: :  .. :  ·::::·.:.·::::·:::::·  :  :·:=:::·:=-:::=:::·.::·:·.:.-:·:::·: .. ::::::·=::::::::,:::,:.:::)·:::-::.' :::.:: .. ;  :,::  :. :.:  ,-·:··:  ::::  ::  YL\::=::=·.'each'·NCJ:J:.::;.::::::t:::=::::}(:::T:'::::=.::::::n·:;:?::: 
:=  :=:-==::::::·:= .. :  .=·  =  .:.  =:rrr:~:·~::  · ·  ·  .... · · · ·  ..  · ·  ·  · ·  ·  .. ·  ·  .... ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ........ ·  ·  ·  ·  .. ·  .. · ·  .. ·  ......  ·..  ·  · ·  · ·  · ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
::.::·.·:·::  .. :·::.:.::·:·=:.;.  ·:  ... :  ..  ::.::::~:  .. :·  ·.:.':.:=.:.·:  · ..  : ·.  : :·:··::·=::-<· ·:.--:.:  ... ::\:tt.)"\::r:::::.'  .. ·.:  :j.::\:{;::;:sdi::  ·~~~ro..:H:n  .. ;::,:.;.o  ..  ~.:.\~·~.::-::~.::!\  :·:::::::: ....  "'·  :•·:  .. ,: ... ,::.~~~?~···}:~·/.n:I:::~·:·:.:  .. :: 
....  ...  .  ..  ...  .  .. ~~-.  ~  .....  -=<·:=:.=:::.:  ~~~~.vJ.··  ......... . 
:.:·.:.:.:::  .. :.·.::.:  ..  :.:::.::.:  .. :.::  .. :.·  .. :.:.:.:.·:·.·:.:.:.:~.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.·.:  ...  ;·'.::.:·:.:·:.:·  .  ..:-.·.::  .·:.:.8.·  ·.·.e.:·g··  ··m.:::.  :.·:.:~·:·:··.:n.::::teti.'::·\·::.:  .. :::.>:::::::.:::.:'.:  ... :::::  ..  :.:.·:.:.:  .. :.:.:.::.:.:'.::.:.:::··.:.:·· ,::::::  :-:.:::r~:::::::·:Jiq~tyt::y:_':·:~=:::::-::·:·::::::.::·:::.:. ·.:  ·.:  ..  .,,.,-_: .. ,  ,  .. '·  ·:.: ::'iiQUi&!Y· :::: .. :::  ·::·:::::·:.::=:':.::: .  .-.. :· =  · ·: ·  · :·· 
····::  .. :  .;.,.;.:,.  .. :  .. :  ..  .  :.·  .. : :. :  ··:  ;.;·.·:(Q·'"··>··>·-= ··=···=.: ·· ....  ·:·  .  ·:.::  ..  =.··  ...  ·.:,·:.:.···H···.:  ...  ,  ..  ·.·Ioc··.·.·~·····:~··.:.D·u····.··:o·.)·:··.·n:·=  .. :·.·  ...  ·:::.:.:o·  ..  ::··.·.:.;:~~···::··.::··:=.···::::::::··:: ...  : , : ... ., .....  . 
·····  ····:·:::<:::::::L=-:r>~~:·:-:::::;::  .::::::::.<q:  .. :  .. :.  :.:  ...  ~.>~:':~::::-:.\:  ::<::n·TH:.:·/.::~ :;~j·:~=:;:/&.':~:·::~i:Lon  .  .::\:/u.:~.:}:::::::,.:i>£:  :::·.,:·:  :,~..  nJ  ~.  :·: ... ::::: .. .:..  ·.·.·.:.:.: 
..  ..  . .  . .  .  ..  ·:·.:·:·.:::·:-.·  ..  ·  .. ,,·.::.:  ..  =.::  ..  .  .....  '  ..... 
·:·.::  .. ::.:::::::::::::=.:.:::.:::.:.::::::::=·:,  :·::: ·:··· :=:  ·  ··  ::.':':··::::  ··.  :.· ·  :,::.:,:.:.:.:.::::::  ·.:  .:commeraardredifufthfF:· :,.,,  · ·=··  "ln~rciat'~i: · ·  · 
:  ·.  ·:·;.:,:.:.:::  .. :.  ::·:·.-=·  :: .. :·::  :  ·.·.::  .:  <::::.:- .. :::: :.  ·  .· ·· ·  ·: ...... ,  ..... -=:·  . .  ·:~t-e::seJJ::jf~(:: · ·  :  .. ·  ::.: ·  ·  ·  :: .:::::.~~:  .. ~·iiie::area::~f.r·:: 
.:::::.:·: .. ·  ..  ,..=:.:.:  .. :.:.:  ... ::.::  .. :  ..  ·.'·:.:.·  .. :  ...  ··.·'.:·'·.:.···.  ,::.::.=: .. ,  .... ,,  :·:=::.-:  :.:·,::-;:  ..  :  .,:.:·:::-=.><··=·:  ... ,,  .........  ·  :·.=  .:.·:  .. '"·:  .......  · =.: ... :.'.·:.:::.'::.·'·'·'·.::==:.  =.:· .. :  ... ·:.:.: ....  ·.r  .. :·  .. ··:.t  .. ::~-:=:·: :·  ...  ·j,i:.i.:t:.:.:i.'*··.c:.:·n···  ... ·:::.:  ..  :.:.·~::.T  ·  ... :·:  ···.··.:  ·  ·.·  ·  · 
.:.:,::.<:--.·:  .· .. :.·.·.·:-:··:·.·.;  .....  ·  ........................... ; ..  : .. :·:·::·.:.·  >-:·::··_.·:-:  .. ·  1·.···.·.-~l;.l.,.,  ,.·/··:,..:·:·:.:.-::.::-:: 
Consider  now  the  possibility  that  a  monetary  institution  operating  in  the 
jurisdiction of NCBB  is allowed to participate in a tender undertaken by NCBA -41-
and makes the best offer in, say, an open purchase. If  the reserve money ofNCBA 
is equivalent to the reserve money of  NCBB, as it ought to be in a monetary union, 
the OMO will immediately imply a liquidity leak from the monetary system of 
country A into the monetary system of country B,  so that the OMO, instead of 
affecting the monetary aggregate of A as intended, will affect the aggregate of B. 
Similarly, even if  this possibility is ruled out so that only national primary dealers 
are allowed to participate in the tenders, there is no guarantee that a similar leak 
does  not  occur if for  example  an  international  firm  borrows  a  commensurate 
amount from  the  local banks  and  places the money in the  banking  system  of 
another member country. 
The point is that possibilities like those mentioned here will exist,  and they are 
desirable in order to promote integration of financial markets. At the same time, 
these transactions are bound to produce some undesirable effects on the balances 
of the NCBs with the ECB,  because the  latter are  supposed to be subjected to 
reserve requirements.  So, there is a source of tension arising from the possibility 
that "a normative importance" can be attached to the balances of the NCBs with 
the ECB. Open market operations in a decentralised system may have effects on 
the reserve balances of NCBs, depending on the identities of the counterparts or 
the ultimate  users  of liquidity.  So,  from  the vety narrow nationalistic  point of 
view, NCBs would prefer a system of complete segmentation, which maximises 
the effectiveness of  their own policies. In many respects, their ideal resembles (B) 
which is exactly what we had and what the projects of  the internal market and the 
EMU tried to abolish. 
If,  on the other hand,  an ECB-Funds market is established at the level of DBs, 
which  essentially  is  identical  to  the  centralised  system,  it will  be  completely 
immaterial who is the original recipient of  liquidity or where the system is drained 
from liquidity, and the transition to the ideal final position (A) does not need to 
pass through the intermediate stage  (C).  Financial and monetary integration are 
probably complementary, with one reinforcing the other. 
In conclusion, the ambition to promote financial integration is not fully compatible 
with the idea of decentralised monetary  control,  as  the  former  undermines the 
possibilities for the NCBs to control their liabilities. On the other hand, a system 
of an  ECB-Funds  market  at  the  level  of private  banks  may  enhance  the 
possibilities to speed-up even other forms of  market integration. 
4.3 Conclusions 
The ESCB  is supposed to work under the principal target of maintaining price 
stability. How well it succeeds with its task is, among other things, a function of 
the institutional framework and how markets perceive the institutional guarantees. 
There is an element in the proposed model for the ECB which may give rise to 
credibility problems, namely the risk that diverging national preferences vis-a-vis 
inflation can break trough in the policy stance. If institutional arrangements are 
material for the credibility aspect, the proposed model may suffer from a structural 
weakness.  Complementary  mechanisms  such  as  side-payments  are  probably -42-
necessary for driving the policy stance towards low inflation, and the problem is 
that markets can always speculate about the adequate amounts of transfers and the 
current willingness-to-pay from the side of the net contributors.  Thus,  there is a 
risk that the ability of the monetary aggregate to produce the desired effect may 
vary according to the expectations about the outcome of  the bargaining. 
A similar conclusion has been drawn about decentralisation, if existing NCBs are 
supposed to play a significant role in monetary management. It is difficult to find 
room for  any  substantial  subsidiarity under the  constraint that  monetary  policy 
must be effective. Undoubtedly, the idea of a smooth, step-by-step, transition from 
the  very  decentralised system  of today to  the  completely centralised  system  of 
stage three, is very attractive. As Cros-Thygesen (1992) put it,  "it anticipates the 
hierarchical structure between the ECB and national central banks that will arise 
once full EMU has been reached. If  the reserves are levied on the monetary base, 
the reserve coefficient could be raised over time until it reaches  100 per cent. At 
this point national central banks would become the  equivalent of wholly owned 
subsidiaries of  the ECB". 
However, we have seen that the dynamics of a gradual transition work against the 
effectiveness and stability of  the system, and our conclusion is that long periods of 
intermediate regimes can derail the whole project. -43-
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A favourite cliche among central bankers is that monetary targeting is as much an 
art as a science. Yet, to the extent it is a science, it is more econometrics than eco-
nomics. Undoubtedly, this conventional wisdom reflects the fact that the eternal 
trial-and-error process associated with monetary targeting, can be best perceived as 
being in the intersection of these concepts.  However, to analytically define this 
intersection must be an art per se. 
The starting point for this paper was that a convincing econometric evidence about 
a stable relationship between a european monetary aggregate, and european infla-
tion and output exists.  Hence,  the relevance of a monetary aggregate  as  a first 
choice intermediate target was examined in section 2.2. According to the analysis, 
the EMA is a good choice if  the predominant shocks to the European economy in 
the foreseeable future have their origin on the real side. It was found that its candi-
dature  can be supported by our best guesses  about future  shocks.  Besides,  the 
· closeness of  the European economy makes exchange rates less attractive than they 
used to be for the individual countries. 
Then, an appraisal of  the econometric evidence was endeavoured, and the question 
marks attached to the relevance of  this evidence had their origin in the following. 
First the ex ante nature of the relationship was examined in detail. More specifi-
cally, the influence of some factors that are likely to distort the behaviour of the 
estimate in the future has been examined. Among other things, we looked at the so 
called targeting aspect,  the institutional aspect and the possible influence of its 
worst enemy, financial innovation. 
In general terms, the so called targeting problem sugsests that monetary aggregates 
are quite inflexible as policy instruments; current use makes them less capable for 
future use.  So, the stability property is not invariant to the frequency of the use, 
and successful targeting by the ECB presupposes that it takes over a stable situ-
ation. In other words, in order to preserve the strength of  the aggregate for a rainy 
day there should be no need for immediate over-activation of  it. 
The pertinence of  the institutional aspects stems from the credibility aspect, i.e. the 
institutional guarantees for adherence to ultimate targets. In a sense, institutional 
arrangements reflect the underlying preferences. In this respect, the composition of 
the Governing Council of the ECB may prove problematic, as there is a risk that 
private actors, rightly or not, can be led to believe that the preferences of  its mem-
bers are heterogeneous.  Therefore,  the  policy stance  can be perceived as  being 
subjected to bargaining, about which markets can speculate. If suspicions are veri-
fied,  the capability of the  EMA,  and monetary policies in general,  to maintain 
price stability will be seriously damaged for a long period if not permanently. If 
not, a demonstration period is necessary to persuade market participants, with an 
obvious risk to make the EMA useless due to the above mentioned targeting as-
pect. 
Finally, in the wake offmancial integration, there is an increased need for pruden-
tial supervision of  financial intermediaries. Besides, competition is expected to be 
more vigorous  and we  face  the problem of overcapacity in the banking  sector. -44-
Thus, there are strong incentives for fmancial innovation, with the attending in-
stability in money demand. 
Second, the money demand functions  have been estimated under special condi-
tions. The most important are the inconsistent statistics and the positive influence 
of  the asymmetric nature of  the ERM. The EMA has been derived by the method 
of adding up national monies, which has been shown to be inappropriate due to 
statistical inconsistencies.  So, to the extent these inconsistencies are significant, 
the estimate is not statistically identical with the aggregate which will be targeted 
by the ECB. Moreover, the asymmetric nature of the ERM makes the estimated 
EMA entirely determined by the demand side and, consequently, very well corre-
lated with real activity. As an effect, the strong correlation found in the studies is 
partly a function of  the current regime. A targeted EMA will be a completely dif-
ferent thing. 
Even the subsidiarity aspect of  monetary control has been examined, and no argu-
ments have been found supporting the possibility of keeping the NCBs active in 
monetary management. The ESCB will certainly perform better if  its basic func-
tions are centralised. 
In conclusion, we know vecy little about the ex post properties of  the EMA. This is 
hardly surprising and certainly not a very comforting result.  However, we know 
where to search for additional information. -45-
APPENDIX: ASYMMETRIC AND SYMMETRIC SYSTEMS COMPARED 
As mentioned in section 2.5, the key-factors in the adjustment are the direction of 
capital flows and what makes interest rates in the centre cowttry to move.  In the 
following  subsections we  present the  case-by-case  effects  of different types  of 
shocks under the two alternative exchange rate regimes. 
AI: Real Asymmetric Shocks 
Assume  that  a  real  shocks  aftlicts  one  of the  European  cowttries.  The  first 
example, shown in diagram 3, considers a case which in many respects reminds of 
the German unification shock. In order to keep this parallel, we treat the German 
unification as  a demand  shock  pushing the  IS  curve  to  the right.  If  the  centre 
cowttry keeps its money supply wtchanged, the increased money demand will push 
the interest rate upwards.  The  attending interest rate differential induces capital 
flows  from  peripheral cowttries into the centre.  As  this inflow is  sterilised, the 
area-wide money supply will decline and the new equilibrium will be established 
at a  higher interest rate  level.  This  particular adjustment  transmits  therefore  a 
converse shock (i.e., a negative monetary shock) into the peripheral economies. In 
total, higher interest rates dampen the local shock in the centre (as in Poole's one-
cowttry model) at the  expense of a monetary squeeze in the whole area.  Thus, 
when this  type  of shocks  occur,  the  monetary  system  redistributes  economic 
activity  between  the  centre  and  the  periphery.  Moreover,  one  can  observe  a 
correlation  between  aggregate  money  supply  and  economic  activity  in  the 
periphery. -46-
In a second example we consider a similar real shock in the periphery.  For the 
same reason as before, the demand shock moves the IS curve to the right, tending 
to raise the interest rate of the periphery. The interest rate differential induces a 
capital inflow from the centre, but this inflow is not sterilised in the periphery. 
Sterilization2'  of the  outflow in the  centre  leaves  however money  supply  and 
interest rate unchanged, implying that the capital flow continues until the capital 
inflow  in the  periphery  has  fully  accommodated  excess  money  demand.  The 
monetary accommodation of  the real shock simply means an additional stimulus in 
the peripheral economy, shown as a move of  the LM curve to the right in diagram 
2. In total, real asymmetric shocks in the periphery are magnified by the monetary 
accommodation, but not transmitted into the centre.  Again,  one can observe a 
strong correlation between aggregate money supply and income in the periphery. 
Consider now a similar real shock as in the previous case but under a symmetric 
regime.  The basic difference is that the capital outflow from the centre reduces 
money supply there, because the targeted monetary aggregate is the global one. In 
diagram 4 it is shown as a jump of the LM curve to the left.  Moreover, interest 
rates tend to increase in the centre country which has a stabilising effect on the 
capital flows. For the same reason, increased base money in the periphery helps to 
attain a new equilibrium which, because of the flexibility of the interest rates, is 
less dramatic in its real effects than in the case above.  However, this stabilising 
property came about by imposing a real cost on the other country, as the monetary 
adjustment transmits a negative shock in the centre country. 
25 This can be achieved in several ways, for example by purchase of  bonds by the central bank. -47-
A2: Adjustment to Nominal Shocks 
Consider  a  nominal  shock  in  the  periphery,  for  example  a  decline  in money 
demand depicted in diagram 6 as  a move  of the LM-curve to the right.  Excess 
supply of liquidity in the periphery tends to lower the local interest rate, causing 
an capital flow from the periphery to the  centre.  As  the inflow in the centre is 
sterilised,  interest  rates  do  not move  in the  centre  and  the  outflow  from  the 
periphery continues until a new equilibrium is established at the  original level. 
Thus,  the  asymmetric  regime  has  the  capability  to  completely  absorb  all 
asymmetric monetary shocks in the periphery. -48-
As  monetary  stability  is  the  salient feature  of a  country  in  order  to  gain  the 
privileged position in an asymmetric exchange rate regime, examples of  the effects 
of  monetary shocks have only a theoretical interest. However, in case a monetary 
shock occurs, it will be immediately transmitted into the peripheral countries as for 
example a drop in money demand sets a capital flow in motion which increases 
liquidity in the entire area. This is the case illustrated in diagram 7. It is also self-
evindent  that there  should  be  no  difference  in  what  concerns  adjustment  and 
effects between the symmetric and the asymmetric systems. Under the symmetric 
regime, a drop in money demand anywhere will leave the whole area with excess 
supply of  liquidity and the shocks will be transmitted in the whole area. 
A 3: Speculative Attacks 
All previous cases are based on the assumption that the exchange rate mechanism 
is  credible.  In terms  of the  uncovered  interest  rate  parity,  interest  rates  were 
equalized  because  expected  devaluation  was  zero.  Recent  experience  shows 
nevertheless that this is not the case, and speculative attacks may resurface before 
national currencies are replaced by the ECU.  It is therefore worth examining the 
two systems even from this point of  view. 
A speculative attack  takes the form of a capital outflow from  a country whose 
currency is expected to devalue. The outflow abates as outflows create a interest 
rate differential which compensates for the devaluation risk. As shown in diagram 
8,  the  effects  of such  an  attack  are  quite  different  under  the  two  alternative 
regimes. Assume first the asymmetric system. The outflow is illustrated by a jump 
in the LM curve in the peripheral country to its new position LM".  Again, the LM 
curve of the centre country does not move because the inflow is sterilised.  The -49-
capital flows  stop  when the  interest rate  differential  attains  the  required  level, 
illustrated as the vertical distance between the r85• 
Non-sterilization of the inflow under the  symmetric regime  makes however the 
LM curve in the centre country to shift to the position LM'.  The shift reflects an 
increase in base money which lowers the  interest rate in the  centre.  Thus,  the 
required  interest  rate  differential  can  be  achieved  at  lower  levels,  which  is 
beneficial to the peripheral countries but implies shared burden between centre and 
periphery. 
If  the  reason for  the  attack  is  to  be  found  in lax policies  in the  periphery,  a 
transition from the asymmetric to the symmetric system entails the risk of market 
discipline less compelling.  Under such circumstances, the asymmetric  system is 
preferable on its efficiency properties whereas the symmetric on its distributional 
properties. -50-
ANNEX TO SECTION 4.2: SOME EARLY IDEAS IN DELORS REPORT 
(1) The orooosal of  Governor Ciamoi IDelors Report 00• 225-232) 
(10) Under the scheme the monetary organization of  the Community would have three levels: the 
central monetary institution, national central banks and commercial banks. At the top, the central 
monetary institution would only engage in transactions with member central banks; these, in turn, 
would maintain their present relationships with domestic commercial banks. The central monetary 
institution would act as the central bank of  the national central banks and use its creation of  ECU 
reserves to influence the monetary actions of  member central banks  .... 
(12) The scheme involves three fundamental  components.  The  first  is  an autonomous balance 
sheet for the central monetary institution, ....... The second is a mechanism for ensuring direct and 
firm control of  the supply of  ECUs by the central monetary institution, in strict analogy with the 
control exercised by national central  banks  over domestic money  supply.  The third is  a  set of 
provisions to strengthen national central banlcs' demand  for official ECUs  ..... 
(13) The balance sheet of  the central monetary institution would be based on capital in the form of 
contributions by the central banks  ..... 
(15) Credit mechanisms, .... , are similar to the rediscount facilities  for commercial banks  at the 
national level .... The cost ofthis credit would also be fixed discretionary. 
(16) The third component needed to complete the scheme, .... ,is a specific and exclusive use for 
the ECUs held with the central monetary institution. This is provided by requiring member central 
banks to hold the ECUs as deposits  with the central  monetary institution in the form of both 
compulsory and free reserves. 
(2) Professor Thygesen IDelors Report pp 157-175) 
"The essential feature is that the ECB should be empowered to impose - uniform or differentiated -
reserve requirements on either the increase in the monetaty liabilities of  each national central bank 
or on  the  credit  extended  by  the  member  banks  to  their  respective  domestic  sectors.  This 
requirement would be met only by holdning reserves with the ESCB; and the supply of reserves 
would be entirely controlled by the latter through allocations of  a reserve asset (official ECUs) to 
each central bank corresponding to the demand which would arise, if  agreed targets for money 
creation or domestic credit expansion were observed. Alternatively, the sunnly of  reserves would be 
created by om;n market nurchases of the ESCB. Both cost and availability considerations would 
provide central banks with an incentive to stay close to declared objectives." 
"In  the variants  of an operational  framework  for  an integrated  monetary  policy  described  in 
Governor Ciampi·  s paper and in the previous paragraph, the ESCB would not have any direct 
contact with commercial banks or with financial markets in general. Its sphere of  operation would 
be confined with the second tier of  the three-tier system, the national central banks. This would be 
unduly confining  from the time  during stage three  when a  common currency is  introduced.  To 
manage a  common currency the ESCB would need to have direct transactions with commercial 
banks, as does a national central bank at present. 
(3) Professor Lamfalussy IDelors Report 00• 213-219) 
"..... , three possible approaches to stage two are proposed. The first would be to implement a 
gradual  but formal  transfer of decision-making  power from  the  monetary  authorities  of the 
member countries to a  federal  central banking  institution.  The  second approach - outlined  in 
Governor Ciampi·  s contribution to this collection of  papers - would be to set up a formal two-tier 
system of monetary  control  based  on the  requirement  that  member  central  banks  back their 
creation of local  currency reserves  with ECU reserves  supplied by a  federal  central banking 
institution.  Finally, at the core of the third approach set out in this paper is the idea that  EC 
central banks  should set up a jointly owned  subsidiary,  whose  facilities  they would  share in -51-
perfonning certain of  their functions - notably the implementation of  monetary policy through the 
domestic money and foreign exchange markets - but which would not require them to give up any 
substantial degree of  individual sovereignty over those functions." 
"The  first two  approaches  implicitly  assume  that  some  element of central  bank  authority  or 
resources would need to be put under collective control as a necessary condition for establishing a 
new operational institution in stage two.  By contrast, the third approach essentially reverses the 
order of progress  so that operations  are centralized  in  a new  institution before  resources  are 
formally pooled or authority is granted to a collective body." 
"However,  the largest boost to the monetary union  process would  come  from  centralizing the 
operations through which national monetary policies are implemented. This would cover domestic 
open market and lending operations, as well as intervention in the foreign exchange markets.  It 
would be achieved by establishing a common operations floor and accounting system within the 
jointly owned subsidiarity which could be known from  the outset as the ESCB.  Initially, each 
member central bank would staff its own operations on the common floor rather like a branch, but 
over time these separate national staffs would be merged into a single unit." -52-
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